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"TO PURIFY THE BAR": A CONSTITUTIONAL
APPROACH TO NON-PROFESSIONAL
MISCONDUCT*
CARL M. SELINGERt AND RODRIC B. SCHOENt

A court called upon to discipline an attorney for non-professional
misconduct faces a troublesome and distasteful task. Nevertheless, it
has been generally assumed that "if the house is to be cleaned, it is
for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for strangers, to do
the noisome work."' Whether or not the task of discipline is to be
entrusted exclusively to the legal profession, one would hope that
cumulative experience might by now have established guidelines for
reaching intelligent decisions in this area. Unfortunately, this hope
has not been realized. In 1883, Mr. Justice Field commented on the
"vagueness of thought on this subject in discussions of counsel and
in opinions of courts. ' 2 More recent critical comment has at best
only touched upon the fundamental problems.3
*The quoted phrase in the title is taken from the court's statement in Ex parte
Burr, 4 Fed. Cas. 791, 796 (No. 2186) (C.C.D.C. 1823):
The object of an attachment of contempt is to punish the offender by fine
and imprisonment. The object of the present proceeding is to purify the bar;
and the utmost power which the court can exercise against the party, upon
this proceeding, is to strike his name from the roll.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.
I Chairman, Board of Editors, Natural Resources Journal.
1. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487, 493 (1928) (Cardozo,

J.).

A few states try disciplinary cases before an ordinary civil jury. See Note, Due
Process of Law in State Disbarment Proceedings, 37 Notre Dame Law. 346, 351 (1962).
Although the fact-finding abilities of jurors are entitled to respect in disciplinary proceedings, see text p. 364 infra, there is no reason to suppose that jurors are equally well
qualified to judge professional fitness. Even if the jury is strictly limited to fact issues, there is the danger that the publicity of a trial may both inhibit the filing of
just complaints and encourage spiteful charges. One commentator has advocated the
inclusion of lay members on bar disciplinary committees as a means to assuage
popular suspicions. Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses That
Justify Disbarment, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 9, 25-26 (1935). This suggestion merits serious
consideration, but like many other procedural questions connected with disciplinary
proceedings, it lies beyond the scope of the present article, which deals with substantive standards for discipline. For an integrated discussion of disciplinary procedures,
see generally 37 Notre Dame Law., supra, at 346. See also Willner v. Committee on
Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
2. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 302 (1883) (dissenting opinion).
3. Some illumination is given by the following comments: Dreyfus & Walker,
Grounds and Procedure for Discipline of Attorneys, 18 Law. Guild Rev. 67 (1958) ;
Note, The Imposition of Disciplinary Measure for Misconduct of Attorneys, 52 Colum.
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The difficulties involved in imposing discipline for non-professional misconduct have been brought to the attention of the New
Mexico bar by the decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court in
In re Morris,4 in which the court's new rules for disciplinary proceedings, adopting in substance the American Bar Association
Model Rules,5 were applied to an attorney convicted of involuntary
L. Rev. 1039 (1952) ; Note, Disbarment: Non-Professional Conduct Demonstrating
Unfitness to Practice, 43 Cornell L.Q. 489 (1958). Other comments have, however,
merely added to the confusion: Bradway, supra note 1; Note, Disciplining the Attorney for Extra-ProfessionalMisconduct, 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 487 (1961).
4. 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (1964).
5. 81 A.B.A. Rep. 482-90 (1956). The New Mexico Supreme Court appears to be
one of the few state high courts that have adopted the ABA Model Rules. See also Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 1, art. VII (Supp. 1964).
The New Mexico rules were adopted by the supreme court on August 22, 1960, and
became effective on November 1, 1960. The rules are codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-21(3) (Supp. 1965). Promulgation of the 1960 rules for discipline represents the first
effort by the supreme court to provide a comprehensive guide to members of the bar
since a 1941 act by the legislature authorized the court to make rules "to define and
regulate the practice of law" within the state. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-1 (1953).
The supreme court, in the preamble to the 1960 rules, declared that it had the
"inherent power . . . to determine what constitutes grounds for the discipline of
lawyers . . . and to revoke the license of every lawyer whose unfitness to practice
has been duly established. [The] court may not properly delegate such power or
duty, or recognize the existence of either elsewhere than in itself." Although the
supreme court has thus asserted its power and duty in the area of attorney discipline,
it is not clear that the legislature by the 1941 act recognized such power to rest exclusively with the supreme court. Prior to 1941, the legislature had provided that the
supreme court might disbar or suspend an attorney for his conviction "of felony or
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-17(1) (1953). In
section 18-1-17, the legislature also enumerated other forms of misconduct-of a professional nature-for which the supreme court might suspend or disbar. Apparently
the legislature was not satisfied that the discretionary language of section 18-1-17(1)
could be trusted to effect the legislative policy, for additional statutes were enacted
providing that the supreme court was compelled to disbar an attorney upon its receipt
of a copy of the attorney's conviction of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 18-1-18, -20 (1953). Section 18-1-20, which removes the
discretionary effect of section 18-1-17(1), specifically requires disbarment if in accordance with section 18-1-17(1), supra, the attorney is convicted "of felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." The choice of language in section 18-1-17(1)
seems to emphasize the element of moral turpitude, whether or not the crime is a
felony or a misdemeanor. The language in the other mandatory disbarment section,
18-1-18, stresses conviction of "a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude," apparently requiring disbarment for conviction of any felony regardless of
the element of moral turpitude. However, in view of the court's statement in the preamble to its 1960 rules, such nuances of language as do exist in the statutes are notable only as curiosities.
A review of New Mexico discipline cases reveals that the supreme court has on
occasion relied on sections 18-1-17(1) and 18-1-20, in combination, to impose discipline.
See, e.g., In re McGarry, 68 N.M. 308, 316 P.2d 718 (1961). In McGarry, the misconduct was non-professional--conviction of giving fraudulent and worthless checksand the conviction and bar commissioner's hearing occurred prior to adoption of the
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manslaughter. Because the court's opinion in Morris, like those
from other jurisdictions, overlooks the constitutional dimensions of
the disciplinary problem, it provides a suitable base for an extended
exploration. After considering the peculiar constitutional issue inherent in the Morris decision, this article will analyze the constitutional framework within which a scheme of discipline for non-professional misconduct must operate. Finally, in the context of disciplinary problems that have confronted the profession, the article
will offer a new approach to the "noisome work."
1960 rules, though the case was decided after the new rules had gone into effect. No
case seems ever to have mentioned section 18-1-18.
The court's concept of its inherent and exclusive power to discipline attorneys does
not date merely from the 1941 legislation or the 1960 rules. In a decision involving
professional misconduct, State ex rel. Wood v. Raynolds, 22 N.M. 1, 158 Pac. 413
(1916), the court asserted its inherent power to discipline in the absence of legislative
action, and added that the legislature could not abridge that power, 22 N.M. at 5,
158 Pac. at 414. It was not until the legislature created the integrated bar in 1925
(Laws 1925, ch. 100), and sought by statute to invest the commissioners of the state
bar with power to discipline attorneys (Laws 1925, ch. 100, § 6), that the supreme
court was required to assert its exclusive power to disbar. In In re Royall, 33 N.M.
386, 268 Pac. 570 (1928), the court, in a one-page opinion citing Raynolds, supra,
said that disbarment of an attorney is a strictly judicial function, 33 N.M. at 387, 268
Pac. at 570. The court in a later opinion, In re Gibson, 35 N.M. 550, 4 P.2d 643 (1931),
amplified the Royall opinion and said that legislative acts conferring power to disbar
on the bar commissioners violated the state constitution (N.M. Const. art. III, § 1) and
were repugnant to the doctrine of separation of powers, 35 N.M. at 565, 4 P.2d at 651 ;
the legislature could not usurp a judicial power. Considering this constitutional bar to
legislative action, perhaps the 1941 act was merely a belated legislative surrender to
the supreme court. In any event, the court's position is made clear by the preamble to
the 1960 rules.
In some other states, where similar exclusive and inherent powers have been asserted by supreme courts, the courts have reached a degree of cooperation with the
legislative policy without undue conflict. For an account of judicial and legislative
interplay in other states, see Bradway, supra note 1, at 12-13.
In New Mexico, the legislature has created a statutory muddle through its act in
1909 (Laws 1909, ch. 53) creating a board of bar examiners and providing for the
disbarment of attorneys; by its act in 1925 (Laws 1925, ch. 100) integrating the state
bar, and by the 1941 act (Laws 1941, ch. 96) authorizing the supreme court to regulate
the practice of law. Little care has been exercised by the legislature in specific repeal
of conflicting statutes, and the compiler has been understandably reluctant to delete
statutes that may conflict when the legislature has merely indicated that "all statutes
in conflict are repealed." For example, the provisions of the 1925 act, permitting the
commissioners of the state bar to disbar or suspend an attorney, declared void in the
Royall opinion in 1928, were not repealed until 963 (Laws 1963, ch. 81, omitting the
disciplinary powers of the board of bar commissioners contained in former section
18-1-6). The legislature should repeal sections 18-1-17, 18-1-18, and 18-1-20, discussed
supra, for those statutes are not compatible with the 1960 rules or with the 1941 act
authorizing the supreme court to regulate the practice of law.
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I
THE MORRIS CASE
A.

A Decision for Ambiguity

Morris, an attorney, pleaded guilty and was convicted by a district court on a charge of involuntary manslaughter. The charge resulted from the killing of five members of a family which occurred
during the commission by Morris of an unlawful act not amounting
to a felony-driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. 6 Morris' car had collidedwith the rear of the
moving automobile in which the decedents were riding. 7 Morris was
fined $500 and required to pay costs, but the district court, relying
on the testimony of witnesses to Morris' good character, placed
him on probation, suspended the fine, and deferred sentencing for
twelve months." The court's disposition of the case did not pass
unnoticed. A popular New Mexico columnist, Will Harrison,
charged the district court with displaying unusual leniency because
of favoritism toward a fellow member of the bar. The district court
responded to this criticism by citing Harrison for criminal contemptY
6. Brief for Relator, p. 2, In re Morris, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (1964).
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of
two kinds . . . 2nd. Involuntary: In the commission of an unlawful act not amounting
to felony . . . . " N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 36, § 2. The New Mexico criminal code in effect
when Morris' conduct occurred, including the foregoing section, was repealed by N.M.
Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 30-1. The current involuntary manslaughter provision is codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-3 (Repl. 1964). "It is unlawful and punishable . . . for
any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive . . . any vehicle
within this state." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-22-2(a) (Repl. 1960). Because driving under the
influence is punishable in the county jail rather than the penitentiary (§ 64-22-2(c)),
and is not denominated a felony, it was classed as a misdemeanor under the former
criminal code. N.M. Laws 1853-54, at 82. The present criminal code continues this
classification for a first violation, but now because a sentence of no more than ninety
days may be imposed. Sections 40A-1-6 (Repl. 1964) and 64-22-2(c) (Repl. 1960).
7. Brief for Relator, p. 2.
8. Id., pp. 3-4. The trial court is given authority to suspend sentence or defer
sentencing by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-29-15 (Repl. 1964).
In April, 1965, the trial judge dismissed the manslaughter charges after permitting
Morris to change his plea from guilty to innocent. The trial judge acted upon recommendation of the probation officer and the state's attorney who had prosecuted the manslaughter charge. Albuquerque Tribune, May 1, 1965, p. A-1, col. 2.
9. Harrison had commented on the Morris trial in at least six of his daily columns
between November 12, 1963 and January 22, 1964. He had compared the sentence
given Morris to the 1-to-S year sentence for manslaughter imposed by another district
judge on Elirio Trujillo, who Harrison described as a "humble Santa Fe driver."
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Three prominent Santa Fe residents were killed when their car was struck by
one driven by Trujillo. N.Y. Times, March 31, 1964, p. 17, cols. 1-6.
Harrison, in the November 12,1963, column wrote:
Naturally, the lawyers' handling of a lawyer in trouble-in this case a
public prosecuting lawyer-has set off widespread comment.
. 0 * •
What the court does with the humble Santa Fe driver who killed the
prominent people will go on record with what the court did with the prominent
driver who killed the humble people.
In his column of January 22,1964, Harrison said:
There has been widespread comment about the no fine, no jail judgment of
the court in handling a fellow lawyer.
Among the most critical are lawyers themselves who fear that the profession is being made to appear as a favored group in court.
Albuquerque Tribune, Jan. 22, 1964, p. B-3, cols. 1-2. After publication of the January
22nd column, counsel for Morris filed affidavits with the same judge who had presided
at Morris' criminal trial and requested that Harrison be cited for contempt because his
comments "tended to bring the state's judicial system into contempt and disrepute."
N.Y. Times, supra.
On March 27, 1964, Harrison was convicted of criminal contempt, the judge determining that because there had not been a final disposition of the Morris case (the sentence having been deferred), the court's motives were not open to journalistic speculation. Harrison was fined $250 and given a ten-day jail sentence, but the fine and
sentence were suspended pending appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court. N.Y.
Times, supra. Relying on decisions of the United States Supreme Court, particularly
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), and subsequent first amendment cases, the
New Mexico Supreme Court reversed Harrison's contempt conviction on October 4,
1965. State v. Morris, 4 N.M. State Bar Bull. 151, 156 (1965). Specifically, the court concluded that the appellee had "failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a clear and present danger, or imminent peril, to the administration of justice" in Harrison's comments about Morris' manslaughter conviction.
Id. at 155.
A short editorial in The New York Times, speaking of Harrison's conviction for
contempt, said, "As for the case against a journalist who probed too deeply, and was
rewarded for his efforts with a criminal contempt sentence, that smacks of some primitive concept of. law west of the Pecos, as if the First Amendment did not exist."
N.Y. Times, April 2, 1964, p. 32, cols. 1-2. The 1965 session of the New Mexico legislature enacted a bill providing for jury trial or disqualification of an interested judge
in cases of "indirect" criminal contempt arising from "written publications made out of
court." N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-1-3.1, 21-5-8 (Supp. 1965). "The bill was introduced as
a direct result of the contempt trial a year ago of Santa Fe Columnist Will Harrison."
Albuquerque Tribune, March 24, 1965, p. B-3, cols. 1-2.
In fairness to Judge Paul Tackett, the district judge to whom reference has been
made, it should be noted that he has subsequently deferred sentencing following the
manslaughter conviction of Larry Ehlers, a plumber's apprentice, whose auto had
collided with one driven by Henry Kiker, a prominent Albuquerque attorney and
popular political leader. Mr. Kiker and his wife were killed in the accident. Albuquerque Journal, May 2, 1965, p. A-4, col. 1 (editorial).
In his column of November 12, 1963, Will Harrison observed that a "Santa Fe
authority on disbarment" thought that Morris would not lose his license to practice
law because state law providing for disbarment required conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Albuquerque Tribune, Nov. 12, 1963, p. B-10, cols. 1-2. Later
developments, of course, proved the "authority" to have been mistaken; but in view of
the language of the supreme court's new rules, to be discussed infra, the judgment
of the "authority on disbarment" could not have been faulted.
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Following Morris' conviction, a disciplinary proceeding was
instituted against him before the New Mexico Board of Bar Commissioners. Relying solely on the transcript of the criminal action,
the board reached the following conclusions:
2. That the conduct of Respondent in the unlawful killing of a human being as charged in the amended information to which he pled
guilty constitutes conduct on the part of Respondent contrary to justice or good morals warranting the imposition of discipline on the Respondent.
3. That for the Respondent to continue without interruption the
practice of law after having been convicted of a crime of the character here involved is harmful to the profession and to the administration of justice.
4. That conduct such as that of the Respondent on the part of a
lawyer and an officer of the court is detrimental to the administration of justice.' 0
The board recommended to the supreme court that Morris be suspended from the practice of law for an indefinite period. In a per
curiam opinion, Justice Noble dissenting, the supreme court adopted
the board's recommendation and ordered indefinite suspension with
leave to apply for termination of the suspension after one year."
The Morris opinion first quoted the applicable supreme court
rules:

'2.04 The commission of any act contrary to honesty, justice or good

morals, whether the act is committed in the course of his relations as
an attorney or otherwise, and whether or not the act is a felony or
misdemeanor, constitutes a cause for discipline. If the act constitutes
a felony or misdemeanor, conviction thereof in a criminal proceeding
is not a condition precedent to discipline.
'2.06 . . . . Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude shall be
conclusive proof of the guilt of the respondent . . . and a plea of

guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, where followed by a judgment
of conviction, shall be deemed to be a conviction within the meaning of this rule.' 12
10. Brief for Relator, pp. 4-5.
11. 74 N.M. at 685, 397 P.2d at 478-79.

12. Id. at 682, 397 P. 2d at 476-77. (Emphasis by the court.) N.M. Sup. Ct. R.
3.3-1.01 to 3-4.02, codified as N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-2-1(3) (Supp. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as N.M. Rules].
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The opinion then posed two issues for decision: (1) Was Morris'
"offense" contrary to honesty, justice, or good morals? (2) Was
"the offense one involving moral turpitude so that conviction thereof
is conclusive proof of guilt requiring disbarring or suspending from
practice ?-13 The second issue was never reached by the court 14 because the court concluded that the basis for discipline is "any act
contrary to honesty, justice, or good morals" and that this standard
is not synonymous with moral turpitude. Later, however, the opinion
reiterated the mandatory nature of discipline for conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude.1 5
The ground for the court's finding that Morris had committed an
"act contrary to honesty, justice and good morals" is unclear. Did
Morris commit such an "act" simply by driving while under the influence of alcohol? Perhaps. The court concluded that "the conduct
of respondent constituted a serious breach by him of his oath to obey
the laws .
,"'I' But in the same sentence the court stressed the
"commission of the offense," evidently the offense of manslaughter.1 7
Thus, the opinion can be construed to hold that the deaths which
resulted from Morris' conduct were the sine qua non of discipline.
The remainder of the court's opinion does not resolve this disturbing ambiguity. Along with moral turpitude, the court rejected as
touchstones for the imposition of discipline the more or less wellestablished lines between crimes constituting felonies and those
amounting to misdemeanors, crimes malum in se and crimes malum
13.

74 N.M. at 682, 397 P.2d at 477.

14. "[M]oral turpitude is not a consideration." Id. at 683, 397 P.2d at 477.
15. 74 N.M. at 682, 397 P.2d at 477. This interpretation of New Mexico rule 3-2.06,
quoted in text accompanying note 12 supra, does not appear justified by its language,
which deals only with proof of facts. However, under prior statutes, disbarment was
mandatory upon conviction of felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§ 18-1-18, -20

(1953). The present status of these statutes is discussed in

note 5 supra.
Absent a determination that Morris had been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, his conviction would not have been entitled to conclusive effect under rule
3-2.06, even with respect to facts essential to a finding of guilt. See text pp. 364-65 infra.
However, Morris made no effort to relitigate the facts in the disciplinary proceedings.
Id. at 684, 379 P.2d at 478. (Emphasis added.)
17. Ibid. The court's concern with the nature of the crime committed by Morris is
emphasized in a later passage:
16.

We must consider only the question of whether the plea of guilty of respondent to a crime of involuntary manslaughter, resulting from driving while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a felony charge, supports the recommendation of suspension.

74 N.M. at 684, 379 P.2d at 478.
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prohibitum, and conduct which is criminal and that which is not.' 8
However, the rejection of the felony-misdemeanor distinction, which
in the present case would tie discipline to the felonious deaths, must
be taken with something more than a grain of salt. At two points
in the opinion the fact that Morris was convicted of a felony is
emphasized. Moreover, the argument made on Morris' behalf that
because driving under the influence is a misdemeanor, "the untoward
or unintended result of such an act-in this instance the death of
five people-would not alter the nature of the act," was expressly
rejected by the court.'" Still, the opinion leaves unanswered the
question whether the deaths-be they characterized as "act," "offense," or whatever-were crucial to the court's decision.
In his thoughtful dissenting opinion, Justice Noble probed this
precise issue. In his judgment, "the result-not the cause-is the determining factor as . . . [the majority] view it" because
the majority has not pointed out anything in the mere fact of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor which in and
of itself evinces a depraved character or which renders a lawyer
untrustworthy or a reflection upon the bar or the court, as an officer
thereof, as distinguished from the violation of any other law
of the
20
road which unintentionally results in the death of another.
Thus, under the majority's reasoning, "a lawyer [lacking good
depth perception] who drove 65 m.p.h. in a posted 60-mile zone
and who struck the rear of another car, with resulting death to an
occupant thereof," would be subject to discipline, though discipline
"for such an unfortunate result of a petty offense" would generally
be found repugnant. Reasoning that the terms "moral turpitude"
and "contrary to honesty, justice and good morals" are synonymous
-a proposition amply supported by authority21-and that moral
turpitude requires an act that "offends the generally accepted moral
18. 74 N.M. at 683, 397 P.2d at 477-78. The court attached "no significance" to the
fact that Morris was serving as an assistant district attorney at the time he committed
the offense. Id. at 684, 397 P.2d at 478. For a discussion of discipline of attorneys holding public office for which membership in the bar is a prerequisite, see note 220 infra.
19. 74 N.M. at 682-83, 379 P.2d at 477.
20. Id. at 688, 379 P.2d at 481.
21. See authorities cited by Justice Noble, 74 N.M. at 686, 379 P.2d at 479. See
also Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 111 Atl. 861 (1920) ; In re
Needham, 364 Ill.
65, 4 N.E.2d 19 (1936) ; In re McNeese, 346 Mo. 425, 142 S.W.2d 33
(1940); In re Jacoby, 74 Ohio App. 147, 57 N.E.2d 932 (1943); State v. McCarthy,
255 Wis. 234, 38 N.W.2d 679 (1949). For the proposition that the terms are not synonymous, the majority cites no authority.
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code of mankind," the dissenting justice concluded from precedent
that the offense of driving under the influence "is not, in and of itself, one contrary to 'honesty, justice and good morals.' "22
B.

EqualProtectionfor Morris?
Almost as an afterthought, the court in Morris dismissed as without merit the claim that discipline under the circumstances would
violate the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Because that amendment guarantees to all persons "the equal
protection of the laws," the constitutional objection surely deserved
more extended treatment. Although obscured by ambiguous language, the deaths may have been decisive in the Morris case; for
disciplinary purposes a line may have been drawn between the misdemeanor of driving under the influence and the felony of an unintentional killing while committing this misdemeanor. May such a
line be drawn constitutionally?
That a state's standards for admission to the bar are subject to
scrutiny under the equal protection clause was made plain by the
United States Supreme Court in a case originating in New Mexico,
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners:
A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from
any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely

because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular
church. Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State
cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding
that he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356.23

If the equal protection clause applies to standards for admission to
the bar, it should apply with all the more rigor to criteria for expulsion from practice with its accompanying disgrace and deprivation of a hard-earned means of livelihood. 4
An equal protection analysis concedes, for purposes of argument,
that under a reasonable classification scheme Morris could have
been suspended from the practice of law. The issue is whether the
New Mexico Supreme Court could discipline 'Morris while allow22. See authorities cited, 74 N.M. at 686, 379 P.2d at 479.
23. 353 U.S. 252, 238-39 (1957).
24. Ct. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 145-48 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
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ing those lawyers who are convicted only of driving under the influence of alcohol (at least in circumstances presenting substantial
danger to human life) to continue practicing without interruption.25
In their classic exposition of the equal protection clause, Tussman
and Ten Broek succinctly state the general standard: "A reasonable
classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law."2 6
The goals that may be achieved by imposing discipline for nonprofessional misconduct can easily be identified. In the first place,
there is the regulatory objective of removing from the bar attorneys
who are unfit to practice law. Indeed, in the landmark case of Ex
parte Wall,2 7 Mr. Justice Field, dissenting, maintained that professional fitness is the only proper criterion for dealing with an attorney's non-professional misconduct:
It is only for that moral delinquency which consists in a want of
integrity and trustworthiness, and renders him an unsafe person
to manage the legal business of
others, that the courts can interfere
28
and summon him before them.

But another possible regulatory goal is indicated by Justice Field's
reference to a New Jersey case in which counsel "on behalf of members of the bar, called upon the court to relieve them from the reproach of having the man attached to their profession, and from
the disgrace of being compelled, in their professional duties, to
have intercourse with one whom they would be ashamed to associate
in private life. ' 2 And a third regulatory purpose is apparent in
the assertion by the majority in Ex parte Wall that discipline can be
imposed to protect the court from "scandal and contempt." 3 0 Apart
from these regulatory purposes there is, of course, the possibility
that an entire scheme of discipline for non-professional misconduct
or the discipline imposed in a particular case will be designed in part
25. An analogous pattern of constitutional analysis can be found in the Supreme
Court decisions passing upon state statutes that authorized the sterilization of feebleminded persons and habitual criminals. While sterilization does not per se constitute
denial of substantive due process, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), the criteria for
choosing those upon whom sterilization is to be performed may conflict with the equal
protection clause, Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
26. Tussman & Ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341,

346 (1949).
27. 107 U.S. 265 (1883).
28. Id. at 307.
29. 107 U.S. at 307-08.
30. Id. at 288.
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to "punish" the attorney in the narrow sense of seeking to effectuate
"the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence.""1
It will be argued later in this article that neither a desire to
punish nor, in general, a fear of hostile public reaction may suffice
constitutionally as the sole justification for imposing discipline for
non-professional misconduct. If public hostility must be ignored, a
classification between conduct that results in death and conduct that
might have-but did not-result in death, cannot be justified by
asserting either (1) that there would be so much public hostility
toward a killer that he could not afford his clients adequate representation, or (2) that to allow the killer to practice would bring
general disrepute to the courts and the legal profession. Apart from
the constitutional objection to discipline as punishment, the language of the New Mexico disciplinary rules expressly disclaims any
punitive purpose.3 2 Thus, the classification suggested by the Morris
opinion will be judged solely on its relationship to fitness to practice
law.
Under the standard of fitness to practice, it might be contended
that a distinction determined by the occurrence of death is justified by the simple fact that under New Mexico law manslaughter
a "felony,"34,hile driving under the influence is a
is denominated ' 34
"misdemeanor.
But Morris was convicted under the former
code that distinguished felonies and miscriminal
New Mexico
demeanors on the basis of the place of imprisonment, i.e., the
penitentiary or the county jail.3 5 Such a distinction obviously lacks
31. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). See State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis. 2d 38, 119 N.W.2d 412, 417-18 (1963):
Just as a decision to impose discipline involves 'to some extent a punishment,'
which, however, is not the 'primary consideration' in disciplinary proceedings . . . so too does a decision to impose discipline interpose to some extent
an element of deterrence to others. . . . (Citations omitted.]
While Mr. Chief Justice 'Warren has quite correctly observed in a recent decision that the concept of "punishment" comprehends the purpose of prevention as well as
retribution and deterrence, United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965), a
satisfactory analysis of the constitutional position of attorneys demands separate consideration of these purposes. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, the term "punishment" as used in this article is not intended to include the preventive objective of removing unfit attorneys from practice. This separate treatment of unfitness seems to
coincide with the theory of the New Mexico disciplinary rules. See note 47 infra and
accompanying text.
32. Preamble, N.M. Rules; see text at note 47 infra.
33. Under the former criminal code, manslaughter was punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. Thus, it constituted a felony. N.M. Laws 1853-54, at 82. The
present criminal code classifies involuntary manslaughter as a felony of the fourth
degree. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-3 (B) (Repl. 1964).
34. See note 6 supra.
35. See notes 6 & 33 supra.
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significant relationship to fitness for the practice of law. Although
a felony-misdemeanor line founded upon actual periods of imprisonment might conceivably be related to an attorney's capacity
because of his absence from practice, the distinction drawn in the
present New Mexico criminal code is determined rather by authorized periods of imprisonment-more or less than one year."8 Thus,
as occurred in Morris, a convicted felon may not be imprisoned for
any period of time at all.3 7 In testing a classification drawn for
extra-criminal purposes, the United States Supreme Court has not
deemed itself concluded by the fact that the classification embodies
a traditional distinction in the criminal law. Instead, the Court has
looked behind the distinction to measure the classification against
the statutory purpose. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,38 the Court held
invalid an Oklahoma statute providing for the sterilization of
habitual criminals that drew a line between those crimes classed as
"larceny" and those classed as "embezzlement." Looking to the
purpose of the sterilization law, the Court said:
We have not the slightest basis for inferring that that line has any
significance in eugenics nor that the inheritability of criminal traits

follows the neat legal distinctions which the law has marked between those two offenses.8

9

If discipline of Morris by virtue of the unintended killing cannot
36. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-1-6 (Repl. 1964).
37. See note 8 supra.
38. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
39. Id. at 542. The Court in Skinner, mindful of the far-reaching implications of
a scheme of sterilization and the irreparable injury to the individual sterilized, held
that a "strict scrutiny" of classifications is necessary. 316 U.S. at 541. While it is difficult
to compare sterilization with expulsion from the practice of law, it cannot be denied
that suspension or disbarment results in serious and permanent injury. As the New
Mexico Supreme Court asserted in State ex rel. Wood v. Raynolds 22 N.M. 1, 158 Pac.
413 (1916), "To disbar or suspend . . . [an attorney] from the practice of his profession means the ruination of his professional career, and casts upon his name and
standing a stigma which can never be effaced." Id. at 12, 158 Pac. at 417.
In Skinner it was further observed that for purposes of criminal punishment, Oklahoma treated larceny and embezzlement alike. 316 U.S. at 542. Although Morris can be
distinguished from Skinner in that involuntary manslaughter and drunken driving are
not subject to the same criminal penalties, a difference in penalties would appear to be
significant for extra-criminal regulation only where there is some difference between
the kinds of conduct penalized that would justify the inference that the greater penalty
was imposed for the purpose of additional prevention. Such an inference is not justified
in the case of involuntary manslaughter resulting from drunken driving. See note 45
infra.
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be justified by the felony label,4 ° it must measure up on its own
merits to the test of reasonable relationship to fitness to practice
law. Two possible contentions seem worthy of consideration. First,
it may be argued that one who has unintentionally killed while driving under the influence has indicated the sort of irresponsibility that
is inconsistent with the conscientious discharge of a public trust.
Postponing for the present consideration of the offense of driving
under the influence in relation to professional competence, 4 it
should at least be apparent that such conduct not resulting in death
may often indicate an equal degree of irresponsibility. Thus, on this
basis, a classification determined by unintended death is seriously
"under-inclusive." 4 2 The vice of such an under-inclusive classification
in a case like Morris is that it permits a court to avoid the hard
question whether drunken driving alone is a kind of misconduct
warranting discipline. Avoidance is accomplished by imposing discipline only in those well-publicized situations where the general
horror created by the fatalities is likely to avert criticism. The general problem was perceived with notable clarity by Mr. Justice
43
Jackson, concurring in Railway Express Agency v. New York,
when he said:
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal
Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate
between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation
fairly related to the object of the regulation. This equality is not
merely abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution knew, and
we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical
guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to
require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon
a minority must be'imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens

the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials
to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation
and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon
them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better
40. In determining that a criminal defendant had been entitled to counsel, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has looked behind the line drawn by Mississippi
between felonies and misdemeanors. The court emphasized the severe punishment
authorized-and imposed-for the commission of the misdemeanor for which the defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty. Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (Sth
Cir. 1965).
41. See text p. 357 infra.
42. Tussman & Ten Broek, supra note 26, at 348.
43. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be
44
equal in operation.

To determine that the "driving under the influence-involuntary
manslaughter" distinction may be constitutionally defective for
purposes of discipline is not necessarily to conclude that the classification is unreasonable for purposes of punishment. Although
the classification is under-inclusive in terms of deterrence, prevention, and rehabilitation,4 5 there is still a substantial body of thought
44. Id. at 112-13. Administrative problems may on occasion justify an under-inclusive classification. Tussman & Ten Broek, supra note 26, at 349. Thus, Morris could
probably not have asserted an immunity from discipline grounded on a claim that
some attorneys who have driven under the influence but have not been convicted or
even apprehended would remain undisciplined. However, administrative considerations
would not appear to justify a failure to discipline all attorneys who have been apprehended and convicted of drunken driving in similar risk-creating circumstances.
45. See Comment, The Fallacy and Fortuity of Motor Fehicle Homicide, 41 Neb. L.
Rev. 793 (1962). Cf. Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L.
Rev. 1097, 1105-06 (1952):
Civilized social thought regards the penal law as the ultimate weapon for
diminishing the incidence of major injuries to individuals and institutions,
with only such concessions to retaliatory passions as are practically necessary for the system to survive. In short, while invocation of a penal sanction
necessarily depends on past behavior, the object is control of harmful conduct
in the future.
From the preventive point of view, the harmfulness of conduct rests upon
its tendency to cause the injuries to be prevented far more than on its actual
results; results, indeed, have meaning only insofar as they may indicate or
dramatize the tendencies involved. Reckless driving is no more than reckless
driving if there is a casualty and no less if by good fortune nothing should
occur. Actual consequences may, of course, arouse resentments that have
bearing on the proper sanction. But if the criminality of conduct is to turn on
the result, it rests upon fortuitous considerations unrelated to the major purpose to be served by declaration that behavior is a crime.
Macaulay, A Penal Code Prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners 64-65 n.M.
(1837), quoted in Paulsen & Kadish, Criminal Law and Its Processes 612-13 (1962):
'To punish as a murderer every man who, while committing a heinous
offense, causes death by pure misadventure, is a course which evidently adds
nothing to the security of human life. . . . If the punishment for stealing
from a person be too light, let it be increased, and let the increase fall alike
on all the offenders. Surely the worst mode of increasing the punishment of
an offense is to provide that, besides the ordinary punishment, every offender
shall run an exceedingly small risk of being hanged.'
Expressly recognizing the fortuitous nature of deaths caused by the misdemeanor
of drunken driving, the New York Court of Appeals construed that state's misdemeanor-manslaughter statute to be inapplicable to this misdemeanor. People v.
Grieco, 266 N.Y. 48, 193 N.E. 634 (1934). The ALI Model Penal Code has entirely
eliminated the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine. Model Penal Code § 201.3, comment I (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). In recent years, the United States Supreme Court
has shown an increased willingness to impose constitutional limitations on the substance of state criminal law. See Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77
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Harv. L. Rev. 1071 (1964). Thus, it would not be surprising if the Court should begin
to require some measure of equal protection in setting sanctions for various criminal
offenses. Indeed, at least one state court has already taken this step. Rucker v. State,
342 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961).
A comment by Professor Goodhart in the Law Quarterly Rcview [80 L.Q. Rev. 20
(1964)] does undertake to justify on the ground, inter alia, of deterrence the imposition of additional punishment for dangerous driving resulting in death. Goodhart first
quotes a passage from Sir James Stephen which asserts that when two persons engage
in the same negligent conduct but only the one whose conduct causes death is criminally
punished, "'the effect in the way of preventing a repetition of the offense is much the
same as if both were punished.'" 3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England
311 (1883). Even if Stephen were not talking about negligent conduct, his view must be
regarded as unsound. Would the deterrent effect of punishing only every fiftieth thief
who is apprehended be "much the same" as punishing each of the thieves? See
Macaulay, supra. On the issue of deterrence, Goodhart then argues by reference to
the law of attempts under which unsuccessful criminal conduct is not punished as
severely as that which succeeds. The analogy is not very persuasive. If a person is
determined to commit a robbery, is it likely that he will be deterred by being told
that success will result in twice as great a punishment as failure? Deterrence in the
case of such intentional crimes would seem to result almost entirely from the penalty
provided for commission of the substantive offense. See Model Penal Code § 5.05,
comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). The additional increment in punishment for
success can only be explained as retribution. See Waite, The Prevention of Repeated
Crime 8-9 (1943). When the element of retribution is eliminated and attention is
focused on prevention and rehabilitation, attempts and substantive crimes should be
punished alike. Model Penal Code § 5.05, supra.
Only in those jurisdictions where abandonment is not a defense to a prosecution for
attempt does the additional punishment for success tend toward deterrence. The offender is encouraged to desist in order to avoid the more serious punishment. 41 Neb.
L. Rev., supra, at 814. A comparable deterrent effect could be achieved in a dangerous
driving case only when the driving is reckless, i.e., done with a conscious awareness
of a risk to human life. Without this awareness, the use of a lesser punishment for
dangerous driving alone to provide a locus penitentiae would be unsuccessful; a more
severe penalty for killing can have no impact on the person unless he is aware of the
risk created. But even conceding that when there is consciousness of risk to human life
the threat of a more severe penalty if risk becomes reality may, to some extent, serve
to stop the reckless driver, it is difficult to believe that it would match the deterrent
effect of a general increase in punishment for the lesser offense. Thus, Professor
Goodhart's discussion of deterrence does not avoid the underlying problem of weighing
the desirability of retribution against equality in individual prevention and rehabilitation.
By reference to the facts of an unreported English case, Goodhart suggests two justifications other than deterrence for the imposition of more severe punishment when
dangerous driving has resulted in death or serious injury. A young woman, driving
dangerously, had collided with another automobile, "killing two women passengers and
seriously injuring a man." Goodhart goes on to report:
She was fined £50 and banned from driving for five years. The husband of
one of the dead women commented: 'As far as I'm concerned these two were
very cheap lives. It costs you more if you kill a pheasant in Suffolk.' The man
who had been injured in the crash added: 'I'm crippled for life. My hip now
has a plastic joint and I'll never be able to walk properly again.' The young
woman said: 'I think I was lucky. I quite expected to go to prison.'
The reactions of the husband and the injured man probably reflect only a desire for
retribution. But if there is any problem concerning compensation, surely this should be
treated apart from the issue of the severity of criminal punishment. The young woman's
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holding that for purposes of avoiding self-help, reinforcing societal
inhibitions, and providing an outlet for feelings of aggression,
retribution is a legitimate aim of criminal punishment. 4 But retribution is wholly out of place in a scheme whose express purpose
is "the protection of the public, the profession, and the administra' 47
tion of justice, and not the punishment of the person disciplined.
The second possible justification for a disciplinary classification
based upon an unintended killing while driving under the influence
is that the attorney will be so emotionally distraught by the deaths
that he will be unable to practice effectively. But in the absence of
psychiatric evidence substantiating what on its face appears highly
doubtful-that a disabling mental state invariably follows such a
homicide-this classification appears "over-inclusive." 4" While the
dragnet approach of over-inclusive treatment may on occasion be
defended under emergency situations that preclude individual determinations in terms of regulatory purpose, 49 no such administrative necessity would seem to prevent psychiatric examination of
individual attorneys whose mental competence is in question. Indeed, individual examination of attorneys is contemplated in New
5
Mexico in cases of narcotics addiction and alcoholism. "
Assuming that a distinction based solely on the results of Morris'
conduct would violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, it is not entirely clear that this issue could have been
utilized to attack the Morris decision had it been appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. One problem is whether the equal
protection issue was adequately presented to the New Mexico Supreme Court. The briefs filed on behalf of Morris do not mention
the equal protection clause, but counsel for Morris raised a substantive due process argument under the fourteenth amendment,5 1
reaction is hardly surprising in a cultural atmosphere where retributive punishment
has long been both accepted and acceptable. Indeed, the public at large has even been
conditioned to look with equanimity on criminal punishment that bears no relationship

to any recognized objective of the criminal law. No doubt a good many laymen, believing that "ignorance of the law is no excuse," would be surprised by the Supreme Court's
decision in Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). If public expectations are
truly thoughtless, a society should be able to survive their disappointment.
46. See, e.g., Alexander & Staub, The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public 214-23
(1956).

47. Preamble, N.M. Rules.
48. Tussman & Ten Broek, supra note 26, at 351-53.
49. Id. at 352. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81

(1943).

50. N.M. Rule 3-4.02. No comparable provision appears in the American Bar
Association Model Rules.

51. Brief for Respondent, pp. 26-30, In re Morris, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (1964).

OCTOBER, 1965"[

NON-PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

and the problem of inequality was pointed out to the court, albeit
not under the constitutional heading of equal protection.5 2 Moreover, it might truthfully be argued that the equal protection defect
only came to light upon examination of the New Mexico court's
opinion. Another problem lies in the ambiguity of the court's
opinion. It might have been contended before the Supreme Court
that if discipline imposed for driving under the influence is conceded to be constitutional, the decision should be sustained on that
ground, However, if the Court had determined that the ground
actually relied upon by the New Mexico court involved a denial
of equal protection, the Supreme Court would probably not have
looked behind that ground to another unstated-but constitutional
-basis. The decision would have been reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.5 3 The New Mexico Supreme Court would
then have been compelled to decide whether driving under the influence was, without reference to the consequences of that conduct,
sufficient ground for imposing discipline. 4 If the United States
Supreme Court could not have determined from the New Mexico
court's opinion whether the decision rested on the unconstitutional
classification, it might have vacated the judgment of the New
Mexico court and remanded for clarification of the opinion."
A more basic question is whether the equal protection clause protects against inequality by judicial interpretation. Although no cases
seem to be directly in point, the broad language of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins"' and Shelley v. Kraemer5 7 surely indicates the existence of
such protection as a general proposition. The decision in Shelley has
been subjected to considerable criticism, but the criticism has been directed to the fact that the discrimination in that case was by private individuals rather than by a state agency. The notion that judicial action
is state action is clearly valid when the unacceptable classification is
drawn by the court itself. Thus, Morris could have presented a strong
constitutional argument had he been able to show instances in which
the New Mexico Supreme Court had refused to discipline attorneys
for drunk driving convictions; or perhaps, coupling administrative
with judicial action (treating the bar commissioners as an arm of the
court), if he had shown a refusal by the commissioners to recom52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id., p. 16.
See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
Cf. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
11 U.S. 356 (1886).
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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mend such discipline."" But the record in Morris contained no such
evidence. Hence the claim of unreasonable classification would have
been limited to the face of the New Mexico court's opinion, and a
determination that the mere prospect of unequal treatment justified
reversal would have been necessary. Fortunately, such a determination in the Morris case need not have carried the implication that
any judicial decision containing an ill-considered dictum is vulnerable to constitutional attack. Although it is a fundamental assumption of the common law adjudicatory process that the law will work
itself pure on a case-by-case basis, it could well have been concluded
that in Morris the New Mexico court was acting not as a participant
in the common-law process but as a legislative body, either pursuant
to authority granted by the New Mexico legislature or by virtue of
its self-proclaimed and jealously guarded "inherent power . . . to
determine what constitutes grounds for the discipline of lawyers. '""°
For better or worse, most courts of last resort are probably still
influenced by the tradition that in common law cases the giving of
guidance for the future is merely incidental to the function of deciding the particular cases before them. 0 This influence must account in part for the manner in which the prospective force of dicta
is usually discounted. Although the distinction may only be one of
degree, dicta in the opinion of a court construing rules that it has
itself formulated and that are obviously intended to have prospective
effect may reasonably be accorded greater weight. Additionally, it
may be crucial that the New Mexico court seems to have reasoned
through the equality issue, though failing to recognize its full implications. 6 The conclusion that convicted drunk drivers whose
conduct has not led to such tragic consequences are not subject to
discipline is therefore a particularly reliable kind of dictum in terms
of prospective application, i.e., a dictum that represents a step in
the process of reasoning to the court's actual holding.
Because the opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court in the
Morris case suggests a failure to perceive the necessity of providing
58. A showing that the bar committee on ethics had failed to initiate proceedings
against attorneys convicted only of driving under the influence might have been
sufficient to raise the constitutional issue. See note 44 supra, and In re Hallinan, 43
Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954) (claim of bar committee discrimination in charging
tax conviction lacked factual support). Cf. Note, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1103 (1961).
59. Preamble, N.M. Rules. See note 5 supra.
60. See Selinger, Beneficiaries of Sales Warranties in New York: Some Questions
and Comments on New Legal Doctrine, 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 309 (1963).
61. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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equal protection within the legal profession, it is not surprising that
the court omitted consideration of the conditions under which lawyers who engage in non-professional misconduct may, as a class, be
subjected to treatment different from that accorded other citizens
who engage in similar misconduct. This problem is discussed in the
next section of this article.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE IMPOSITION OF
DISCIPLINE

A.

Equal Protectionfor Lawyers: Special Punishment and Special
Regulation

Discipline of a lawyer for non-professional misconduct cannot
constitutionally be justified as punishment. The basis for this proposition rests, as did the objection to the possible classification in
Morris, on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The argument may be stated as follows: Because a state's
interest in deterrence or retribution with regard to non-professional
misconduct is precisely the same whether the conduct is done by a
lawyer or by another, lawyers cannot be singled out for a special
punishment, i.e., expulsion from their calling and means of livelihood.6 2 A state may not give effect to a general punitive objective by
dealing only with lawyers any more than it may act to prevent fires
in wooden laundry buildings by denying licenses only to resident
Chinese aliens, 63 or may conserve its fish by refusing to license only
those fishermen who are resident Japanese aliens.6 4 Some judicial
opinions imposing discipline on attorneys for non-professional misconduct seem to rely, at least in part, on the assumption that double
punishment is necessary when an attorney has violated the criminal
law. Thus, in the Morris case, the court stresses Morris' "breach of
his oath to obey the laws. ' 65 Other opinions assume that an attorney
62.
63.
64.
65.

Cf. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 135-37, 148-49 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
74 N.M. at 684, 397 P.2d at 478. Accord, In re Margolis, 269 Pa. 206, 112 Atl.

478 (1921) ; In re Smith, 133 Wash. 145, 233 Pac. 288 (1925). Contra, Bartos v. District
Court, 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927). See also In re Van Arsdale, 44 N.J. 318, 208 A.2d
801 (1965) (attorney's training and knowledge require special awareness of tax obligations).
Some courts have justified double punishment of attorneys by reference to Canon

32, ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, which provides that "[the lawyer] must . . .
observe and advise his client to observe the statute law . . . ." See, e.g., Cleveland Bar
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in his non-professional activities may be required to observe a degree of rectitude superior to that expected of other citizens. 66 Both
assumptions do violence to the principle of equal protection. A
court "has no regulatory power over the private life of members
of the Bar. '67 In the area of non-professional misconduct, to uncover a punitive purpose in imposing discipline is to reveal an unconstitutional imposition."
Logically, then, it is necessary to see when, for constitutional
purposes, it may be established that a punitive objective underlies
disciplinary proceedings for non-professional misconduct. In this
respect it is useful to consider the pattern of analysis that has been
followed by the United States Supreme Court in testing against
the constitutional bar on ex post facto laws" legislation that excludes persons from various callings. Until the last term of Court, 70
a similar pattern was followed in testing such legislation against
the bill of attainder prohibition.7 1 The classic interpretation of the
prohibition against ex post facto laws is that of the Court in Calder
v. Bull.72 Ex post facto laws include "every law that makes an action
done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when
Ass'n v. Bilinski, 177 Ohio St. 43, 201 N.E.2d 878 (1964) ; State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis.
2d 38, 119 N.W.2d 412 (1963).
66. See, e.g., In re Genser, 15 N.J. 600, 105 A.2d 829 (1954); In re Chartoff, 16
App. Div. 2d 277, 227 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1962). But see Bartos v. District Court, supra
note 65; In re Renehan, 19 N.M. 640, 145 Pac. 111 (1914).
67. Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722, 727 (8th Cir. 1927).
68. With regard to professional misconduct-whether or not constituting a criminal
offense apart from the professional aspect-the situation is quite different. Focusing
on the deterrent aim of punishment, it may well be that for legal institutions to function effectively certain conduct on the part of lawyers must be discouraged though no
objection exists to similar conduct by other citizens. Thus, what would otherwise be
considered good, hard-hitting competition may properly be condemned as "ambulance
chasing" when carried on by attorneys. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) ; cf.
Semler v. Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935). Insofar as the extent of
punishment for general criminal offenses represents a balance between the need to
deter and fundamental considerations of fairness, when a crime also constitutes professional misconduct the legal profession's "special opportunities for deleterious conduct," Cohen v. Hurley, supra, at 126-27, may well justify imposing additional punishment on the lawyer to assure a more profound deterrent effect.
Under a governmental scheme of separation of powers, it would seem that an inherent judicial power to punish, distinguished from the power to control professional
fitness, could extend only to professional misconduct.
69. The ex post facto prohibition applies to Congress and to the states. U.S. Const.
art. I, §§ 9, 10.
70. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). For a discussion of the Brown
decision, see text pp. 331-34 infra.
71. The bill of attainder prohibition applies to Congress and to the states. U.S.
Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
72. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 385 (1798).
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done, criminal, and punishes such action," and "every law that
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when committed. ' 73 The prohibition
73. Id. at 390.
If the conclusion that an intention to punish renders discipline for non-professional
misconduct unconstitutional per se is incorrect, it might still be contended that a finding
of punitive intent in Morris would place that decision in conflict with the ex post facto
prohibition. Punitive intent would be found to exist in Morris if the deaths were crucial
to discipline; see note 86 infra. The retroactivity problem is raised by the New Mexico
Supreme Court's determination that discipline could be imposed for criminal conduct
not involving moral turpitude. Of course, one cannot be certain that a different result
would have been reached had the court deemed itself bound by the traditional standard.
Yet, the court's decision not to pursue the question of moral turpitude, despite its
position that a finding of criminal turpitude would automatically require discipline,
indicates some doubts regarding the nature of Morris' conduct. Thus, it is at least
possible that the imposition of discipline can be traced to the court's determination
that turpitude was not required. Was this conclusion merely a matter of interpreting
the enacted rules for disciplinary proceedings, or did it amount to the ad hoc formulation of an entirely new rule that was then applied retroactively?
As the court in Morris points out, the key provision of the enacted rules is that referring to "the commission of any act contrary to honesty, justice or good morals";
the court's decision is squarely placed on that provision and not on the nebulous
catchall provisions of rule 3-2.02. However, the court's conclusion that these terms
signify a broader concept than "moral turpitude" stands unsupported by authority or
reasoning, and Justice Noble's argument that the terms are synonymous is quite persuasive. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. It may, therefore, be reasonably inferred
that the draftsmen of the comparable ABA rule intended to limit discipline, at least
for the most part, to conduct involving turpitude. True, New Mexico rule 3-2.05 provides that "the fact that an act is malum prohibitum rather than malum in se shall
not, in and of itself, constitute a defense to a charge of misconduct." But because the
operative word is "act" and not "crime," rule 3-2.05 can be reconciled with the foregoing interpretation by construing it to apply only to professional misconduct, e.g.,
"ambulance chasing" or adiertising.
That the prohibition against ex post facto laws might be invoked to bar the retrospective application of a judicially created sanction is at least suggested by Mr. Justice
Black's repudiation of the theory that membership in the bar is "subject to withdrawal
for the 'breach' of whatever vague and indefinite 'duties' the courts and other lawyers
may see fit to impose on a case-by-case basis." Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 144, 147
(1961) (dissenting opinion). See also In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622,,646 (1959) (Black,
J., dissenting). On principle, the ex post facto objection to an additional punishment
for the prior crime in Morris would not be that Morris was denied fair warning concerning sanctions that could be imposed if he committed manslaughter. Aside from
Morris' position that the deaths were inadvertent and hence could not be deterred by
the threat of punishment, even as it might relate to the conscious disregard of a known
risk of danger to human life resulting from his driving under the influence, the claim
would be inadmissible. A fair-warning objection would imply that the criminal law
should allow citizens an informed choice either to refrain from criminal or potentially
criminal conduct or to suffer or risk suffering the penalty, from which follows the
proposition that the prisons are full of fine upstanding folk who have simply decided
to exercise their freedom of choice. Obviously, it matters to society because it matters
to the victims whether one chooses to refrain from committing assaults or chooses to go
to jail. The real objection to the imposition of additional punishment for a past crime
is that the purpose of deterring criminal conduct cannot be served by sanctions pro-
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against bills of attainder can best be understood as one aspect of
the constitutional principle requiring separation of governmental
powers: "A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punish7 4
ment without a judicial trial. 1
7 5 decided in 1866 with
In the landmark case of Ex parte Garland,
a companion case, Cummings v. Missouri,7 6 the Supreme Court was
called upon to apply the ex post facto and bill of attainder prohibitions to the exclusion of an attorney from practice for nonprofessional misconduct. By an 1865 act of Congress, no attorney
was permitted to practice in the federal courts without taking an
oath that he had not done specified acts to further the Confederacy.
Garland, a pre-war member of the Supreme Court bar and later a
confederate legislator, was seeking to continue his practice before
the Court without taking the oath. Relying in part on its reasoning
in Cummings, the Court granted Garland's petition. In Garland and
Cummings, one question for the Court was whether exclusion from
the practice of law, or from the ministry, or from other professional
activity, 77 could ever be considered a punishment. Rejecting the
argument that "to punish one is to deprive him of life, liberty, or
property, and that to take from him anything less than these is no
punishment at all," the Court held that "disqualification from the
pursuits of a lawful avocation, or from positions of trust, or from
the privilege of appearing in the courts, or acting as an executor, administrator or guardian, may also, and often has been, imposed
as punishment. ' 78 Thus, while the permissibility of characterizing
other governmental actions as punishment may still be the subject
of considerable dispute,79 the possibility of such characterization was
early accepted in the case of expulsion from the practice of law."°
mulgated after the conduct has occurred. The additional punishment may deter future
criminal conduct, but for this purpose application of the punishment to past criminality
is unnecessary.
74. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866).
75.

71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).

76. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
77. Included was a prohibition on "acting as a professor or teacher in any educational institution, or in any common or other school." Id. at 280. (Emphasis by the
Court.)
78. 71 U.S. at 320. Accord, United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-18 (1946).
79. A prolonged controversy has occurred within the Court whether deportation
may ever be regarded as punishment. The majority opinions in the following cases
held that deportation can never be so regarded: Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302,
319 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 532 (1954)
(Black, J., dissenting) ; Haraisades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 598 (1952) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
80. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 145-48 (1961) (dissenting opinion).

OCTOBER, 1965]

NON-PROFESSIONAL

MISCONDUCT

The Court in Garland and Cummings did not, however, invoke
the prohibitions against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder
merely because the governmental action could be utilized as punishment. Additionally, these opinions would appear to require that a
punitive purpose be established. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put the
matter in a later ex posi facto case,
The question in each case where unpleasant consequences are brought
to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether
the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident
to a regulation of a present situation, such as the proper qualifications
for a profession. 8'
Thus, the usual process for detecting punitive purpose has been to
look to the relationship between the governmental action and some
non-punitive regulatory purpose. It is not enough that the action
merely purport to be regulatory.8 2 In Garland and Cummings the
Court found a punitive purpose behind the form of establishing
qualifications for various professions.
To avoid a finding of punitive intent, some substantial relationship between the action and the regulatory purpose is required. In
Garland and Cummings, this determination turned on whether the
specified acts of rebellion bore a substantial relationship to fitness
to engage in the professions concerned. In the Supreme Court's
view they did not; and the Court's exposition of this lack of relationship deserves quotation at some length.
Qualifications relate to the fitness or capacity of the party for
a particular pursuit or profession. Webster defines the term to
81. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960). Accord, Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 616 n.9 (1960).
82. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1958):
[T]he Government contends that this statute does not impose a penalty and
that constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to punish are therefore
inapplicable. We are told this is so because a committee of Cabinet members,
in recommending this legislation to the Congress, said it 'technically is not a
penal law.' How simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication
and of law generally if specific problems could be solved by inspection of the
labels pasted on theml . . . Doubtless even a clear legislative classification
of a statute as 'non-penal' would not alter the fundamental nature of a plainly
penal statute.
In Trop the Court applied the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment to invalidate a statute providing for the denaturalization of persons
convicted of deserting from the armed forces in time of war.
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mean 'any natural endowment or any acquirement which fits a person for a place, office, or employment, or enables him to sustain any
character, with success.' It is evident from the nature of the pursuits and professions of the parties, placed under disabilities by the
constitution of Missouri, that many of the acts, from the taint of
which they must purge themselves, have no possible relation to their
fitness for those pursuits and professions. There can be no connection
between the fact that Mr. Cummings entered or left the State of
Missouri to avoid enrolment or draft in the military service of the
United States and his fitness to teach the doctrines or administer the
sacraments of his church ; nor can a fact of this kind or the expression
of words of sympathy with some of the persons drawn into the Rebellion constitute any evidence of the unfitness of the attorney or
counselor to practice his profession, or of the professor to teach the
ordinary branches of education, or of the want of business knowledge
or business capacity in the manager of a corporation, or in any director or trustee. It is manifest upon the simple statement of many of the
acts and of the professions and pursuits, that there is no such relation
between them as to render a denial of the commission of the acts at
all appropriate as a condition of allowing the exercise of the professions and pursuits. The oath could not, therefore, have been required
as a means of ascertaining whether the parties were qualified or not
for their respective callings or the trusts with which they were
charged. It was required in order to reach the person, not the calling.
It was exacted, not from any notion that the several acts designated
indicated unfitness for the callings, but because it was thought that
the several acts deserved punishment, and that for many of them
there was no way to inflict punishment except by depriving the parties,
who had committed them, of some of the rights and privileges of the
83
citizen.

The Supreme Court, in the ex post facto and bill of attainder
areas, has not, however, been willing to characterize as punitive
a legislative standard for the exclusion of persons from a profession merely because the standard may serve to exclude some persons who are fit to continue in practice along with those who are
unfit. In Ex parte Wall, Mr. Justice Field in his dissenting opinion
asserted that "a conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude implies the absence of qualities which fit one for an
office of trust, where the rights and property of others are concerned. ' '8 4 Subsequently, in Hawker v. New York, 85 the Supreme
83. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319-20 (1866).

84. Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 307 (1883).
85. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
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Court was presented with an ex post facto challenge to a New York
statute making unlawful the practice of medicine by anyone who had
been convicted of a felony. Nothwithstanding a dissenting opinion
by Mr. Justice Harlan in which the sweeping nature of the statutory
standard was emphasized,86 a majority of the Court found a sufficient relationship between a felony conviction 87 and lack of the good
character necessary for the practice of medicine:
But if a State may require good character as a condition of the
practice of medicine, it may rightfully determine what shall be the
evidences of that character. We do not mean to say that it has an
arbitrary power in the matter, or that it can make a conclusive test
of that which has no relation to character, but it may take whatever,
according to the experience of mankind, reasonably tends to prove
the fact and make it a test. .

.

. Whatever is ordinarily connected

with bad character, or indicative of it, may be prescribed by the legislature as conclusive evidence thereof. It is not the province of the
courts to say that other tests would be more satisfactory, or that the
naming of other qualifications would be more conductive to the
desired result. These are questions for the legislature to determine.
It is not open to doubt that the commission of crime, the violation
of the penal laws of a State, has some relation to the question of
character. It is not, as a rule, the good people who commit crime.
When the legislature declares that whoever has violated the criminal
laws of the State shall be deemed lacking in good moral character
it is not laying down an arbitrary or fanciful rule-one having no
relation to the subject-matter, but is only appealing to a well recognized fact of human experience . ..
That the form in which this legislation is cast suggests the idea
of the imposition of an additional punishment for past offenses is
not conclusive. We inust look at the substance and not the form,
and the statute should be regarded as though it in terms declared that
one who had violated the criminal laws of the State should be
86. The statute in question . . . takes no account whatever of the character,
at the time of the passage, of the person whose previous conviction of a felony
is made an absolute bar to his right to practice medicine. The offender may
have become, after conviction, a new man in point of character, and so conducted himself as to win the respect of his fellow-men, and be recognized
as one capable, by his skill as a physician, of doing great good. ...
170 U.S. at 204 (dissenting opinion).
87. Dr. Hawker had been convicted of the crime of abortion before the disciplinary
statute was enacted. Because abortion would constitute professional misconduct by
a physician, a finding of punitive purpose would not per se render discipline constitutionally invalid. However, if such a purpose had been found the discipline would
have violated the ex post facto prohibition.
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deemed of such bad character as to be unfit to practice medicine,
and that the record of a trial and conviction should be conclusive
evidence of such violation ...
It is no answer to say that this test of character is not in all cases
absolutely certain, and that sometimes it works harshly. Doubtless,
one who has violated the criminal law may thereafter reform and
become in fact possessed of a good moral character. But the legislature has power in cases of this kind to make a rule of universal application, and no inquiry is permissible back of the rule to ascertain
whether the fact of which the rule is made the absolute test does or
does not exist.""
On the issue of attributing a punitive purpose to the legislature,

it is not difficult to reconcile the decision in Hawker with those in
Garland and Cummings; innocent over-generalization is a common
human failing from which legislators are not immune. In Hawker,
unlike Garland or Cummings, it could fairly have been said that a
characteristic which a legislature might properly regulate-unfit-

ness for professional practice-was possessed by at least a substantial percentage, if not a majority, of those individuals falling
within the legislative classification. Therefore, it would have been
highly speculative to conclude from the over-generalization alone
that the legislative action resulted from a punitive objective 89
88. 170 U.S. at 195-97. Compare DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 158-60 (1960).
89. The quest for punitive purpose in the ex post facto and bill of attainder cases
has not always been ended by a finding of a substantial relationship between the governmental action and a regulatory purpose. At least when the regulatory purpose
would be a creature of judicial reasoning lacking foundation in any demonstrable
legislative intent, the Court may be willing to invalidate the governmental action by
relying upon empirical proof showing that the imposition of discipline was motivated
by a desire to punish. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), upheld an act of
Congress terminating the payment of old-age benefits to aliens deported on certain
grounds, including' (in Nestor's case) one-time membership in the Communist Party
and the commission of certain criminal offenses. Aliens deported for arguably less
blameworthy reasons continued to receive benefits. Answering the claim that the
history and terms of the legislation suggested a punitive purpose, Mr. Justice Harlan,
writing for the majority in Nestor, relied upon a supposed purpose of the social security system to raise national purchasing power-a purpose that is not effectuated
by payments abroad. Justice Harlan's position was that "judicial inquiries into congressional motives are at best a hazardous matter, and when that inquiry seeks to go
behind objective manifestations it becomes a dubious affair indeed." 363 U.S. at 617.
For Justice Harlan the legislative history was too "meagre" to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. In the view of Mr. Justice Brennan, one of four dissenting
Justices in Nestor, the majority's regulatory justification was based on "implication
and vague conjecture." 363 U.S. at 649. Justice Brennan's analysis of the kinds of
conduct to which termination of benefits was and was not attached revealed distinctions
consistent only with a punitive design. Taking note of the "emotional climate" surround-
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Notwithstanding the decision in Hawker, the dissenting Justices
in subsequent ex post facto and bill of attainder cases echoed Justice
Harlan's complaint against legislative standards that operate "without hearing, and without any investigation as to the character or
capacity of the person involved." 9 0 In the ex post facto deportation
cases, disagreement with the majority holding that deportation
could in no event be considered punishment led the dissenters to
explore the problem of adequate relationship to regulatory purpose. Mr. Justice Douglas, in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,9 1 protested automatic deportation for one-time members of the Communist Party in these words:
ing Communism in which Congress acted in the early 1950's, as the Court in Cumminos v. Missouri took note of the climate of the Reconstruction era, 363 U.S. at 637
n.3, Justice Brennan found a congressional purpose to punish. 363 U.S. at 639-40. Compare Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 105 (1958) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The search for actual punitive purpose gained significant support in a more recent
Supreme Court decision, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). In this
case, Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing the opinion of the Court, sustained a procedural
due process attack on an act of Congress providing for administrative denaturalization of persons who loft the country to avoid military service in time of war or national emergency. The conclusion that the enactment was punitive in intent was based
primarily on a careful examination of the legislative history of the statute and its
forerunners. (Compare United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).) Justice Goldberg
took no notice of the contention by Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Mendoza-Martinez,
and relying expressly on the majority's approach in Nestor, 372 U.S. at 209, that
Congress could reasonably have concluded that the existence of . . . a group,
who voluntarily and demonstrably put aside their United States citizenship
'for the duration' could have an extremely adverse effect upon the morale and
thus the war effort not only of the armed forces, but of the millions enlisted in
the defense of their nation on the civilian front.
372 U.S. at 210. (For Justice Brennan's response, see note 184 infra and accompanying text.)
As a general proposition, Justice Harlan was correct in asserting that inquiry into
legislative motives is a "dubious affair," and it must be conceded that a similar inquiry into judicial motives is an infinitely more dubious affair. Yet, it is not inconceivable that, on occasion, sufficient evidence of an actual punitive motive could be
marshaled to invalidate a particular judicial imposition of discipline, despite the existence of a substantial relationship to fitness for the practice of law. Cf. Cohen v. Hurley,
366 U.S. 117, 148 n.37 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). In the Morris case, however, the
adverse critical response to the mild treatment accorded Morris following his criminal
conviction would hardly have sufficed to defeat the imposition of discipline had the
New Mexico court asserted a reliance solely on Morris' conduct-conduct that did bear
a substantial relationship to fitness for the practice of law. See text p. 357 infra. On the
other hand, if the fact that deaths resulted from Morris' misconduct were the reason
for the imposition of discipline, the lack of a substantial relationship to fitness would
itself have established punitive intent, and no inquiry into judicial motivation would
have been necessary.
90. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 204 (1898) (dissenting opinion).
91. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
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[Congress] has ordered these aliens deported not for what they are
but for what they once were. Perhaps a hearing would show that
they continue to be people dangerous and hostile to us. But the
principle of forgiveness and the doctrine of redemption are too deep
in our philosophy to admit that there is no return for those who
92
have once erred.

This critical view of deportation of one-time Communists was
amplified by Justice Douglas in Galvan v. Press.93 And in Marcello
v. Bonds,9 4 in which the Court upheld automatic deportation for a
single violation of the Marihuana Tax Act, Justice Douglas forcefully stated the case for individualized treatment as essential to a
finding of adequate relationship to regulatory purpose.
I would think . . . that, if Congress today passed a law making

any alien who had ever violated any traffic law in this country de. . [T]he bare fact of
a traffic violation would not reasonably be regarded as demonstrating that such a person was presently an undesirable resident. It would
portable, the law would be ex post facto. .

relate solely to an historic incident. . . . The present Act has the
same vice. The alien is not deported after a hearing and on a finding
by the authorities that he is undesirable for continued residence
here. It is the bare past violation of the narcotic laws that is sufficient
and conclusive, however isolated or insignificant such violation may
have been. . . . The case is, therefore, different from the earlier
deportation cases where the past acts were mere counters in weighing present fitness.
In the absence of a rational connection between the imposition
of the penalty of deportation and the present desirability of the alien
as a resident in this country, the conclusion is inescapable that the Act
merely adds a new punishment for a past offense. 95

As the foregoing opinions clearly demonstrate, to conclude that
92. Id. at 601 (dissenting opinion).
93. 347 U.S. 522, 534 (1954) (dissenting opinion)

It is common knowledge that though some of the leading Socialists of Asia
once were Communists, they repudiated the Marxist creed when they experienced its ugly operations, and today are the most effective opponents the
Communists know. So far as the present record shows, Galvan may be such a
man. Or he may be merely one who transgressed and then returned to a more
orthodox political faith. The record is wholly silent about Galvan's present
political activities.
Compare Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 729-30 (1951) (dissenting
opinions of Burton and Douglas, JJ.).
94. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
95. Id. at 320-21 (dissenting opinion).
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a given standard for the expulsion of persons from a calling for
non-professional misconduct cannot be attacked as an imposition of
special punishment is not at all to be certain that the standard will
reach only those who are unfit. The limitations placed by the Constitution on the use of broad standards for regulatory discipline will
be considered in the next subsection of this article. However, before
leaving the present topic of equal protection for lawyers, one premise that has been implicit in the preceding discussion should be
made explicit: The equal protection clause should not be deemed to
preclude special preventive treatment of lawyers who have engaged
in non-professional misconduct. Suppose, for example, that an attorney has repeatedly engaged in the practice of drawing checks on
insufficient funds. Finally, after writing a particularly large bad
check, the attorney is prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to prison.
Having been automatically suspended from practice upon imprisonment, the attorney petitions for readmission following his release."
While many factors may have bearing on the question of the attorney's fitness, certainly the repeated instances of misconduct cut
strongly in favor of denying his petition for readmission.97 Yet,
it may be correctly asserted that continuing his suspension after
completion of the criminal sentence would amount to isolating the
attorney from the mass of non-lawyer bad check artists for special
preventive treatment." It may further be argued that it would be
improper to continue the suspension because, by serving the criminal
sentence imposed by the court, the attorney has already been subjected to that degree of preventive treatment deemed necessary by
established public policy, and, according to that policy, has been rehabilitated.99 These arguments against special preventive treatment
for attorneys are not unimpressive, and can only be met by demon96. Automatic suspension from practice upon a sentence of imprisonment for more
than a minimum term, e.g., thirty days, appears justified as a relatively harmless way
to forestall public reaction adverse to the legal profession. See note 193 inIra and accompanying text.
97. See note 240 infra.
98. A prohibition against such special preventive treatment would, of course, bar
any disciplinary action for non-professional criminality. Cf. Note, 15 Hastings L.J.
339, 347 n.62 (1964):
An example of this [amendatory] legislation is found in Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 6775 (a). Previously, disciplinary action could be taken against a licensee
'who has been convicted of a felony.' As a result of the committee's recommendation this language was changed by amendment in '1957 to one 'who has
been convicted of a felony arising from or in connection with the practice of
engineering. . . .' Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1708, § 2, p. 3082.
99. See Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Prear, 175 Ohio. St. 543, 196 N.E.2d 773, 777 (1964)
(dissenting opinion) (semble).
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strating that because of his professional activity an attorney who
has not in fact been rehabilitated by the processes of the criminal
law presents greater social dangers than unreformed criminals
'engaged in other callings; the greater dangers would then justify
continuation of suspension to achieve "greater preventive certainty."' 1 Without attempting to enumerate the manifold positions
of professional respon'sibility that an attorney must assume, one
can easily be persuaded that the role of the attorney is indeed one
of unusual sensitivity, one reason being that factors of trust, expertise, and judgment can make the attorney's wrongdoing particularly difficult to discover. 10 1
B.

Limitations on Legislative Generalizationin the Regulation of
Fitness

One approach under the Constitution to invalidating a sweeping
legislative generalization was suggested earlier in connection with
the Morris case :102 The classification may be attacked as over-inclusive under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
This approach was illustrated in a series of federal cases in California and Arizona that did not reach the Supreme Court. For
many years it was the practice in certain counties in California and
Arizona for school boards to segregate all children of Mexican ancestry because many of them had English language difficulties that
might retard their education. Nevertheless, there was evidence
100. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 126-27 (1961).
In re Renehan, 19 N.M. 640, 669, 145 Pac. 111, 122 (1914)
This disbarment is not for the purpose of punishing an attorney, but it is
for the purpose of protecting the public against a man who, by reason of
his confidential relations with his clients, has the power to impose upon them
and to defraud them in a way and to an extent which the ordinary citizen
could not do ...
However, the need for greater preventive certainty does not necessarily justify giving
the attorney short shrift procedurally. Cohen v. Hurley, supra, at 131-50 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
101. In other callings requiring public trust, state legislatures have authorized
denial or denial of renewal of licenses to applicants who have been convicted of
a felony or, in some instances, convicted of any crime. E.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. (Repl.
1961), §67-15-56(D) (collection agent; fraud, embezzlement, any crime involving
moral turpitude); § 67-23-17(A) (public accountant; any felony); § 67-24-29(F)
(real estate broker; forgery, embezzlement, obtaining money under false pretenses,
conspiracy to defraud); see also Cal. Ins. Code §704.5 (insurer; felony involving
fraudulent act); N.Y. Banking Law §369-6 (licensed check cashers; felony or any
crime); N.Y. Ins. Law §123-9 (insurance adjuster; felony or any crime involving
fraudulent or dishonest practices).
102. See text p. 314 supra.
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that the scholastic record of the so-called Spanish-speaking pupils
was at times superior, both individually and collectively, to that of
their so-called English-speaking counterparts. This over-inclusive
classification was challenged and struck down in Gonzales v.
Sheely'013 and Mendez v. Westminster School Dist.10 4 In the Gonzales case the court held that
such separate allocation [of students with language difficulties]
can be lawfully made only after credible examination by the appropriate school authorities of each child whose capacity to learn
is under consideration, and the determination of such segregation
must be based wholly upon indiscriminate foreign language impediments in 5the individual child, regardless of his ethnic traits or
10
ancestry.
Another approach to the problem of legislative generalization
may be derived from a line of Supreme Court decisions generated
by the proliferation of loyalty programs for public employees resulting from the cold war against Communism. Presented with
state legislation involving teachers,' 0 6 city employees, 1 7 and candidates for public office,' 08 the Court developed the proposition
that under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment membership in a subversive organization, including the Communist
Party, could be made the basis for exclusion only when the employee
had been aware of the organization's subversive purposes. 0 9 These
103. 96 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Ariz. 1951).
104. 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
105. 96 F. Supp. at 1009.
106. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); cf. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
107. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
108. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
109. See cases cited notes 106, 107 & 108 supra. See also Cramp v. Board of Public
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1961). Cf. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382 (1950) (belief in governmental overthrow under hypothetical circumstances insufficient to deny labor union office). But see Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522
(1954) (stressing the plenary power of Congress over deportation).
One commentator early and persuasively argued against the premise of the public
employment cases that a "knowing" member of a subversive organization could be assumed to sympathize with the organization's objectives. The assumption, according to
the commentator, was contrary to "human nature." Countryman, Loyalty Tests for
Lawyers, 13 Law. Guild Rev. 149, 150 (1953). Subsequent cases strongly suggest that
in the public employment area the Court would today extend the earlier line of decisions
by holding that even a "knowing" member of the Communist Party could not be disqualified from public employment unless he were shown to have been an "active" member. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ; Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203 (1961).

350
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cases might be viewed as having tacitly overruled Hawker v. New
York." 0 Assuming that a classification limited to "knowing" membership in the Communist Party passes the test in Ex parte Garland"' and Cummings v. Missouri'12 as having some substantial
relationship to fitness for public employment," 8 would not the
broader classification, including "innocent" membership, have been
validated by Hawker (if Hawker possessed any continued vitality) ?
One can hardly be convinced that the addition of "innocent members" rendered the number of members who were unfit for public
employment insubstantial, at least when compared with the proportion of unfit doctors within the "felon-doctor" classification in
Hawker. Yet, Hawker could be reconciled with the public employee
cases by considering a legislature's capacity to develop more refined, though still general, standards for professional fitness. In
drafting standards for public employment loyalty legislation focusing on membership in subversive organizations, the elimination of
some members who are fit for public employment by the device of
requiring knowing membership is both obvious and easy. By contrast, the task of the legislature in redrafting the felony generalization in Hawker to liberate even some of the doctors who are fit
for practice might be regarded as not quite so obvious or easy be110. 170 U.S. 189 (1898), discussed at text pp. 322-25 supra.
111. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866), discussed at text pp. 320-22 supra.
112. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), discussed at text pp. 320-22 supra.
113. Special punishment of public employees is no more defensible constitutionally
than special punishment of attorneys. Therefore, the Court should not, perhaps, have
taken for granted that any political belief or activity of a disloyal nature bears a
substantial relationship to common forms of public employment. Only in the context of
a dissent grounded on the first amendment was this assumption challenged:
The fitness of a subway conductor for his job depends on his health, his
promptness, his record for reliability, not on his politics or philosophy of life.
The fitness of a teacher for her job turns on her devotion to that priesthood, her
education, and her performance in the library, in the laboratory, and the classroom, not on her political beliefs.
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 399, 415 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In 1956, the Court did hold that invocation by a professor at a city college of the
privilege against self-incrimination before a congressional committee did not justify,
of itself, the inference that he had either committed a crime connected with his conduct as a professor, or was guilty of perjury. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350
U.S. 551 (1956), as construed in Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
The Court emphasized, inter alia, that the questions concerning past Communist Party
membership that Slochower had refused to answer were not directed to his college
functions. 350 U.S. at 558.
The problem of finding a substantial relationship between general subversive
activity and fitness for a particular calling also exists in the area of attorney misconduct. See, e.g., In re Smith, 133 Wash. 145, 233 Pac. 288 (1925) (incitement to
anarchy). See also text pp. 339-44 infra;
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cause of the number of personal factors, which come quickly to mind,
involved in making such a determination of fitness. 114 Viewed in this
light, the command of the public employment cases is not that the
legislature may not generalize in determining fitness, but rather
that the legislature must do a reasonably good job of it." 5
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court have, nevertheless,
cast serious doubt on the authority of Hawker, and thereby on the
permissibility of legislative generalizations about unfitness, however competently drawn. In the first of these cases, Aptheker v. Secretary of State,"' the Court held unconstitutional under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment an act of Congress that in
effect required denial of a passport to any member of the Communist
Party. In the second case, United States v. Brown," 7 the Court held
invalid as a bill of attainder an act of Congress that made it a
criminal offense for a member of the Communist Party to serve as
an officer of a labor union. In Aptheker, the Court held the "membership" generalization defective in terms of the regulatory objective of national security not only because the category was not
limited by requirements of knowledge of, and commitment to, the
Party's aims, but also because it failed to take account of the purpose for which the individual passport was sought and the "security
sensitivity" of the area desired to be visited.1 A requirement that
such individual factors be considered in each case obviously cripples
any substantial effort at legislative generalization. Similarly, in
Brown, along with redefining the concept of "punishment" for bill
of attainder purposes to include the objective of prevention (in
Brown, the prevention of political strikes), the Court said the
following:
The command of the Bill of Attainder Clause-that a legislature
can provide that persons possessing certain characteristics must abstain from certain activities, but must leave to other tribunals the
114. See Mr. Justice Harlan's remarks, quoted note 86 rupra. Yet, some restriction
of the felony category 'may reasonably be required of the legislature. See text at note
149 infra.
115. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), and note
109 supra.
116. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
117. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
118. 378 U.S. at 511-12. The Court was also disturbed by the anomalous application of the statute that would prevent a Communist from traveling to Europe or Asia
for some innocent purpose, such as reading "rare manuscripts in the Bodleian Library
of Oxford University," while Communists bent on criminal activity could travel
throughout the Western Hemisphere, no passport being required for such travel. Ibid.
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task of deciding who possesses those characteristics-does not mean
that a legislature cannot use a shorthand phrase to summarize the
characteristics with which it is concerned .... 119
[But] the designation of Communists as those persons likely to cause
political strikes is not the substitution of a semantically equivalent
phrase .... 120

lptheker and Brown cannot reasonably be reconciled with Hawker, and Hawker should therefore be regarded as overruled. 2 ' Two
possible distinctions between the cases may be rejected as without
substantial merit:
(1) The legislation in Hawker does not inflict "its deprivation
upon the members of a political group thought to present a threat

to the national security."' 2 This distinction may be meaningful in
terms of the historical background of bills of attainder, 123 but the
119. 381 U.S. at 454 n.29.
120. Id. at 455.
121. In Rehman v. California, 85 Sup. Ct. 8 (Douglas, Circuit Justice), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 930 (1964), Mr. Justice Douglas denied an application for bail pending an
appeal in the state courts from a conviction for crimes arising from the defendantphysician's profesrional practice. With reference to his earlier order removing as a
condition for bail the surrender of the defendant's license to practice medicine, Justice
Douglas said:
A doctor might well go to prison for a misdeed in connection with his practice
and yet not automatically lose his right to practice medicine. Deprivation of a
professional license should require a hearing, since broader issues than those
in the criminal case are involved, e.g., whether the misdeed is of a character
to make it unsafe and improvident for the State to entrust a medical license
to that person.
85 Sup. Ct. at 9. On the issue of additional punishment for professional misconduct,
compare note 68 supra.
122. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 453 (1965). The quotation in the text
represents one distinction drawn by the Court between the legislation in Brown and
the "conflict of interest" provision of the Banking Act of 1933:
'No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated
association, no partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks,
bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve at the same time as an officer,
director, or employee of any member bank except in limited classes of cases
in which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may allow
such service by general regulations when in the judgment of the said Board
it would not unduly influence the investment policies of such member bank
or the advice it gives its customers regarding investments.'
48 Stat. 162, 194, as amended, 49 Stat. 709, 12 U.S.C. §78 (1964), quoted 381 U.S. at 453.
123. 381 U.S. at 453. However, the Court in Brown had earlier expressly rejected
"a narrow historical reading" of the bill of attainder prohibition, Id. at 447.
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concept of due process relied upon in Aptheker is not so burdened
by history. And it is difficult to see why preventive generalization
would be more acceptable in the case of reasonably apprehended
danger to a given physician's patients than in the case of reasonably
apprehended danger to the security of the nation.' 24
(2) The legislation in Hawker does not present those who are
fit in terms of regulatory purpose with the necessity of giving up a
constitutionally protected right to avoid the established generalization; "freedom of association is itself guaranteed in the First
Amendment,"'2 5 but no such guaranty protects the commission of
felonies. A distinction drawn on the basis of the secondary effect of
a particular generalization on a constitutionally protected right is
thus suggested by language in lptheker, and the line would provide
a convenient stopping place for those who would find unacceptable
a broad-gauge requirement of individualized regulatory treatment.
Yet, such a distinction would not be faithful to the Court's central
thesis in either 4ptheker or Brown. In lptheker, principal emphasis
is placed on the direct interference with the right to travel.'2 6 Moreover, in an aside, the Court seems particularly concerned with
another secondary effect of the passport restriction, the effect on
an individual's right to work-the very right asserted by Dr.
Hawker. 27 It is even more difficult to read Brown as limited to
generalizations involving secondary effects on protected rights. To
do so is to treat as little more than makeweight the Court's extended discussion of the separation of governmental powers im124. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). "IT]he right of selfpreservation [is) 'the ultimate value of any society.'" Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 128 (1959).
125. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964). The government
had contended in Aptheker that a member of the Communist Party "could recapture
his freedom to travel by simply in good faith abandoning his membership in the
organization." Ibid.
126. 378 U.S. at 505-07.
'The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot
be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. ...
Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers
as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the
country . . . may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of
what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme
of values.'
Id. at 505-06, quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958).
127. 378 U.S. at 512 n.11. Both appellants in Aptheker desired to write, publish,
and lecture about their observations abroad. Appellant Aptheker also desired to fulfill
invitations to lecture abroad. Id. at 511 n.10.
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prohibition.2

plicit in the bill of attainder
In Brown, the best hint
of the Court's thinking regarding a limitation on the necessity for
individualized determinations lies in its unwillingness to extend the
principle to conflict-of-interest legislation.1 29 This unwillingness
cannot be explained on the ground that conflict-of-interest legislation has no secondary effect on constitutionally protected rights.3 °
The decisions in Aptheker and Brown do appear to yield a stopping place, but it is one lying far beyond the legislation in Hawker.
Apart from an emergency situation precluding individualized treatment,"' a legislature may generalize if, and only if, it can be reasonably assumed that the generalization will serve as well as any known
individualized treatment to identify those persons who fall within
the permissible regulatory purpose. For example, in Dent v. West
Virginia,' the Supreme Court upheld state legislation initiating
a licensing arrangement for physicians that permitted only doctors
who had graduated from a medical school, practiced for ten years,
or passed a special examination to continue in practice-notwithstanding the likelihood that some doctors then practicing without
133
such qualifications may have been fit.
Similarly, generalizations in
conflict-of-interest legislation may be permissible until it can be
shown that methods of individualized determination would produce
more reliable estimates of the danger involved in particular cases
than broad judgments made by the
legislature from its "general
' 4
knowledge of human psychology.' 1
More important, perhaps, than the ultimate reach of Alptheker
128. 381 U.S. at 441-46. See also note 119 supra and accompanying text.
129. 381 U.S. at 453-56. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
130. For example, the conflict-of-interest provision of the Banking Act, quoted note
122 supra, may have the secondary effect of discouraging employment with an underwriting corporation, employment that should be entitled to as much constitutional protection as membership in the Communist Party.
131. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
132. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
133. Cf. I Davis, Administrative Law 497 (1958):
The way to determine the quality of a bar candidate's training and understanding is not by hearing but by examination, for testimony and crossexamination are intrinsically ill suited to the inquiry.
As techniques for more individualized treatment become available, they should be
utilized in place of broader generalizations.
134. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 454 (1965). The only exception that has
been made under the "escape clause" in the Banking Act conflict-of-interest provision,
note 122 supra, relates to dealers in securities issued by the federal government or by
various federally-created entities. 12 C.F.R. § 218.2 (1963).
If conflict-of-interest legislation is to be effective, it must prevent the conflict from
arising. Therefore, a scheme of individualized treatment could not draw upon evidence
of the individual's past record in resisting the particular temptation.
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and Brown is the manner in which these decisions may continue to
permit the use of qualified generalizations: generalizations that are
not conclusive, but do express a legislative judgment concerning the
probative value of a given fact with regard to a particular regulatory purpose. The permissibility of such qualified generalization
would answer to some extent the complaints of the dissenting Justices in 4ptheker and Brown that the majority holdings make effective regulation impossible because of problems of proof. 3 ' A
legislature may identify even such a broadly generalized element
as membership in the Communist Party or the commission of a
felony as "one factor" to be considered in making an individualized
determination.'3 6 Beyond this, under the Court's recent decision in
United States v. Gainey, 37 certain facts may apparently be made
prima facie evidence that the individual concerned falls within the
legislature's regulatory purpose. 8" Such a qualified generalization
would be subject to both the requirements of substantial relationship'39 and competent draftsmanship. 40 It should be required not
only that the mathematical probabilities generated by the classifi41
cation standing alone meet the necessary degree of persuasion,'
135. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 472 (1965) (White, J., dissenting)
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 527 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting).
136. In Aptheker, supra note 135, the Court refers with approval to Executive
Order No. 9835, under which "membership in a Communist organization is not considered conclusive but only as one factor to be weighed in determining the loyalty of
an applicant or employee." 378 U.S. at 513.
137. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
138. The term "prima facie evidence" is here used to denote evidence that standing alone will adequately support but not compel a finding in terms of regulatory
purpose. In Gainey, supra note 137, the Court upheld two statutory provisions authorizing a jury to infer guilt of the substantive offenses of possessing or operating an
illegal still from the fact of the defendant's unexplained presence at the site of the still.
139. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 267 (1957).
140. See Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). But see Barsky v.
Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
141. The Court in United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), see note 138 supra,
emphasized the fact that innocent persons are "rarely" found in the presence of an
illegal still. 380 U.S. at 67-68. Of course, the jury in a criminal case must be persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt. That there may be some leeway, however, between the
probative value of a statutory "qualified generalization" and the degree of persuasion
required is suggested by language in Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468 (1943),
and by the Court's decision in Mobile, J. & K. C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35
(1910).
New Mexico disciplinary rule 3-1.12 requires clear and convincing proof of an attorney's misconduct. The comparable ABA model rule requires proof only by a preponderance of the evidence. In the absence of a prior criminal conviction, most courts
have concluded that clear and convincing proof is the appropriate standard. See, e.g.,
In re Wilson, 76 Ariz. 49, 258 P.2d 433 (1953) ; State ex rel. Joseph v. Mannix, 13 Ore.
329, 288 Pac. 507 (1930) ; In re Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527, 26 A.2d 335 (1942). The higher
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but that it be reasonably evident under the circumstances of the
particular case that other significant evidence was not readily available to those asserting the individual's unfitness.' 42 With these
limitations, a qualified generalization may probably be given the
further effect of shifting the burden of production, or even the
burden of persuasion, on the issue of unfitness. 43
With reference to the discipline of attorneys for non-professional
misconduct, one implication from the foregoing constitutional development is clear. A state may not automatically impose discipline
for the commission of any felony,'4 or for any crime involving moral
standard of proof seems justified by the severe consequences that may follow a finding
of misconduct. Cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1957):
While this is not a criminal case, its consequences for Konigsberg take it out of
the ordinary run of civil cases. The Committee's action prevents him from earning a living by practicing law. This deprivation has grave consequences for
a man who has spent years of study and a great deal of money in preparing
to be a lawyer.
142. Cf. Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945). Compare Sargent v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940). In
United States v. Gainey, supra note 141, the Court construed the statutory provisions
to permit the judge to take the case from the jury even when the defendant's presence
at the illegal still was unexplained. Whatever might be the merits of a bar committee's
claim of a lack of investigatory resources in disciplinary cases generally (compare
the majority and dissenting opinions in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366
U.S. 36, 41-42, 71 n.32 (1961)), and particularly in proceedings involving professional
misconduct, see Note, 70 Yale L.J. 288, 293-94 (1960), there is no reason why the bar
committee should be able to rely on a prior judgment of conviction without producing
a readily available transcript of the testimony offered during the criminal prosecution.
143. The Court in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), emphasized
that the passport legislation established an "irrebuttable presumption." 378 U.S. at 511.
(Emphasis added.) Even in a criminal case, when the prosecution has introduced
statutorily specified evidence of sufficient probative value, the burden of persuasion may
be shifted to the defendant. Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925). Notwithstanding the possible secondary effect on free speech, when a bar committee has
introduced evidence of sufficient probative value tending to show unlawful advocacy of
governmental overthrow, the burden of persuasion on this issue may be shifted to an
applicant for admission to the bar. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra note
142, at 80-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-18 (1953) ; N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90(4) ; Utah
Code Ann. §78-51-37 (1953); Va. Code Ann. § 54-73 (Repl. 1958). Mississippi and
Alabama provide that disbarment is mandatory upon conviction of any felony, except
manslaughter. Miss. Code Ann. § 8667 (1956) ; Ala. Code tit. 46, § 49 (1958). See also
the former rule of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, quoted in In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 289 n.8 (1953).
In United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), the Court's discussion of bills of
attainder and the separation of powers emphasizes the manner in which legislative
action may be characterized by passion rather than by detachment. 381 U.S. at 442-46.
Nevertheless, a more fundamental objection to trial by legislation may be the absence
of "an adversary proceeding accompanied by traditional judicial safeguards." Note,
The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 Yale L.J. 330, 350 (1962). Viewed in this light, the bill of attainder
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turpitude, 145 or for engaging in any other form of non-professional
misconduct. 14 Only an individualized determination that the attorney is unfit for practice will be constitutionally sufficient. Furthermore, even as a qualified generalization, a standard that comprehends all felonies appears defectively broad. 4 7 Too many crimes
have nothing to do with an attorney's professional fitness, 48 and the
legislature-or a court with power to formulate general rules for
discipline-may readily eliminate such irrelevant crimes by limiting
its generalization to those crimes that involve, for example, "intentional dishonesty for purposes of personal gain.' ' 14 "The attribute
of common honesty is one that . . . every attorney should pos0
sess."'

15

The qualified generalization most commonly adopted to justify
discipline for non-professional misconduct refers to crimes involving
moral turpitude. 5 ' Occasionally, the term "moral turpitude" has
apparently been qualified by the requirement that the turpitude
must "tend to show unfitness for practice."' 52 So qualified, the standprohibition would be applicable to generalizations embodied in rules of court as well
as in legislation. See Countryman, supra note 109, at 151 n.20. On the technical question
of raising the prohibition with regard to the rules of a United States district court,
see 28 U.S.C. §2072 (1964) (federal rules enabling act), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 83. No
reason is apparent why the due process analysis in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964), would not apply with full force to rules of court.
145. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6101, 6102; Md. Code Ann. art. 10; § 16
(1957).
146. In contrast to the conflict-of-interest area, see note 134 supra and accompanying text, individualized treatment is useful in determining whether a given act of
non-professional misconduct should be regarded as demonstrating an attorney's unfitness to practice. See text pp. 357-60 infra.
147. Typical statutes permit the court to suspend or disbar the attorney upon his
conviction of any felony or any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-267 (1956); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 481.15 (1958) ; Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 2.48.220 (1961). See also In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946).
148. See text p. 353 infra.
149. In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768, 771 (1954).
150. In re Wells, 293 Ky. 201, 169 S.W.2d 720, 732 (1943).
Of course, qualified generalizations may also comprehend non-criminal dishonesty
(e.g., "conduct involving willful deceit or fraud"), and some kinds of criminal misconduct not involving dishonesty (e.g., "a criminal offense showing professional unfitness"). See N.C. Gen. Stat. §84-28(2) (Repl. 1965), in which the quoted phrases
appear.
151. Some statutes and rules impose the moral turpitude limitation with respect to
all crimes. E.g., D.C. Code Ann. §§ 11-2102, -2103 (Supp. fI, 1964) ; Rule 4, U.S. Dist.
Ct. So. & E. Dist. of N.Y. (McKinney N.Y. Ct. Rules 1965). See also In re Needham,
364 Il1. 65, 4 N.E.2d 19 (1936) ; N.M. Rule 2.04, quoted at note 12 supra. Most courts
have used the "honesty, justice and good morals" language synonymously with the
term "moral turpitude." See cases cited note 21 supra. Other statutes limit the moral
turpitude requirement to misdemeanors. See statutes cited note 147 supra.
152. See Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1927) (semble).
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ard is unobjectionable. However, more often courts have seized
upon the ethical connotation of the phrase "moral turpitude" as an
invitation to pass censorious personal judgment, 1 53 or to assume a
role as the oracle of community morality."" The irrelevance of an
individual judge's personal morality speaks for itself,'5 5 and even if
it were possible to divine the prevailing moral climate, 51 its only
relevance would be in the court's estimation of potential public reaction if discipline were not imposed. It is unlikely that a court
may constitutionally take cognizance of such a factor. 5 7 Furthermore, the moral turpitude standard is objectionable because of the
temptation it provides to derive from an attorney's misconduct in
a particular respect a portrait of his entire character more in keeping with dramatic license than with common sense. 5s
153. See Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 152 Atl. 292, 294-95 (1930):
[T]he mutual violent infatuation was continued by this defendant with the
wife of an honorable man for nearly three years, until in defiance of moral
laws and social observance they were apprehended carrying on their illegal
association in a hotel in the business center of Hartford. So far had they gone
in this course as to be careless of social observance or even decency. . . . Not
a syllable of penitence from the respondent appears in this record for the profession which he has dishonored, or the law which he has outraged, or the
social customs and institutions of his country which he has treated with
contumely. He has, as the trial judge said in sentencing him, 'deliberately
chosen to put his own ideas of law above what you might fairly call the laws
of God and man.'
Concerning at least one judge, it should have been hoped that his moral sense was
more acute than his appreciation of sardonic humor. See In re Smith, 133 Wash. 145,
233 Pac. 288, 289 (1925).
154. See, e.g., In re Jacoby, 74 Ohio App. 147, 57 N.E.2d 932, 936 (1943): "[T]he
norm of conduct by which an act is judged to determine whether it involves moral
turpitude is a standard prevailing in the United States and at the present time." In re
Hicks, 163 Okla. 29, 20 P.2d 896, 897 (1933) ("the opinions of the good and respectable
members of the community") ; Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722, 732 (8th Cir. 1927)
(concurring opinion) :
The manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors has, long before the enactment of the prohibition laws, been considered immoral, and many of the
secret societies, such as Masons, Odd Fellows, Knights of Pythias, and similar
organizations, have denied them admission long before the adoption of the
Eighteenth Amendment and the National Prohibition Act. Should members
of the legal profession adopt a lower standard of morality than these organizations?
155. Bartos v. District Court, supra note 154, at 725.
156. Compare the majority opinion of Judge Learned Hand with the dissenting
opinion of Judge Frank in Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1947).
157. See text pp. 347-51 infra.
158. See In re Hicks, 163 Okla. 29, 20 P.2d 896, 897 (1933):
We cannot understand how an attorney at the bar can be in an immoral
state of mind and continue in the practice of immorality and wickedness, and
still render efficient and just service to any one calling upon him for his ser-
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Limitations on Individualized Determinations of Unfitness

Even under a scheme of individualized treatment, it should be
apparent that the enforcement of a prohibition against the special
punishment of attorneys depends ultimately upon the willingness of
the United States Supreme Court to strike down unreasonable impositions of discipline in particular cases. After a painfully slow
beginning, the Court has come to perceive this obligation.
In 1945, the Court decided the first of the notable bar-admission
cases that have proven so deeply divisive on issues of freedom of
speech, conscience, and association,' 5 9 and on issues of reasonable
qualifications to practice law. 6 " In re Summers'6 ' revealed a disturbing reluctance to reexamine a state court's determination of unfitness.

A highly respected professor of law, Clyde Summers, had been
denied admission to the Illinois bar because, in the view of the state
bar committee and the Illinois Supreme Court, Summers' conscienvices. Men who are guilty of debased, wicked, and immoral conduct do not
have the same idea of righteous conduct that moral men possess.
Shakespeare, Titus Andronicus, act V, iii:
I am no baby, I, that with base prayers
I should repent the evils I have done:
Ten thousand worse than ever yet I did
Would I perform, if I might have my will:
If one good deed in all my life I did,
I do repent it from my very soul.
159. See Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Unfinished Debate Between Justice Harlan and Justice Black, 21 Law in Transition 155 (1961). Because
the problems transcend the immediate question of attorneys' misconduct, this article
omits from specific consideration the first amendment issues presented by misconduct that consists of political activity. See authorities discussed in Kalven & Steffen,
supra. See also In re Margolis, 269 Pa. 206, 112 At. 478 (1921) ; In re Smith, 133 Wash.
145, 233 Pac. 288 (1925) (both cases involved activity in behalf of the I.W.W.). Thus,
there is no discussion of the recent controversy concerning the "balancing" of first
amendment freedoms, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), or of
the subsisting dispute whether all speech or political speech is entitled to a "preferred
position," Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Against the interests that a state may have in excluding an attorney from practice,
this' article treats only the attorney's interest in continued professional activity. However, with respect to the weight of this interest, there has been no hesitation in using for
precedential purposes Supreme Court decisions hedging about the power of a state
to suppress political discussion.
160. It might be argued that a punitive purpose manifested in denial of admission to the bar could raise no problem of inequality; so long as all persons engaging
in the proscribed conduct were barred from the profession, there could be no problem of
special punishment. Although the rejection of this kind oi argument in the present
situation may suggest some close questions and the need for further distinctions, it
must be rejected as making no flesh and blood sense. Simply too few individuals desire
to be lawyers for the punishment to be regarded as equal.
161. 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
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tious objection to military service made it impossible for him to take
in good faith the required oath to support the constitution of
Illinois. Linking the oath to the "good citizenship" requirement of
the Illinois rules for admission, and emphasizing deference to that
state's decision, Mr. Justice Reed concluded for the majority that
Summers' "unwillingness to serve in the [Illinois] militia" justified
his exclusion from the bar.1 2 In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice
Black was obviously concerned with the majority's failure to show

any special connection between conscientious objection and the practice of law. After stressing Summers' unquestioned professional and
moral qualifications, Justice Black said:

[I]f Illinois can bar this petitioner from the practice of law it can
bar every person from every public occupation solely because he
believes in non-resistance rather than in force. For a lawyer is no
more subject to call for military duty than a plumber,
a highway
1613
worker, a Secretary of State, or a prison chaplain.
Beyond the absence of any special connection between conscientious
objection and the practice of law, Justice Black seems to have made

an additional point: Unfitness only under extremely hypothetical and
conjectural circumstances should not justify exclusion from the bar.
The Illinois Constitution itself prohibits the draft of conscientious
objectors except in time of war and also excepts from militia duty
persons who are 'exempted by the laws of the United States.' It
has not drafted men into the militia since 1864, and if it ever should
again, no one can say that it will not, as has the Congress of the
United States, exempt men who honestly entertain the views that
this petitioner does. Thus the probability that Illinois would ever
call the petitioner to serve in a war has little more reality than
16 4
an imaginary quantity in mathematics.
162. Id. at 569-73.
[T]he majority explicitly rested its decision on the naturalization cases
[denying citizenship to aliens refusing to pledge military service] such as
Sehwimmer [279 U.S. 644 (1929)] and Macintosh [283 U.S. 605 (1931)], but
these were overruled a year later in the Girouard case [328 U.S. 61 (1946)].
And while it is true that the Girouard case went only to the construction of
the federal statute and not to its constitutionality, it is difficult to believe that
it did not deal a fatal blow to the already shaky prestige of Summers as a
precedent.
Kalven & Steffen, supra note 159, at 160.
163. 325 U.S. at 575.
164. Id. at 577.
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By 1954, the majority's philosophy of deference to state determinations of unfitness had seemingly led it to entirely abdicate
constitutional responsibility in the area of professional discipline. The
nadir was reached in Barsky v. Board of Regents. 6 5 A New York
statute provided that the license of a physician might be revoked
or suspended by the board of regents for the conviction of a crime.
Dr. Edward Barsky, national chairman of the Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee, was convicted in a federal court for refusing
to produce certain papers for examination by the House Un-American Activities Committee. He was sentenced to a six-month jail term
and fined $500. Upon Barsky's release from jail, the board of
regents imposed a six-month suspension from the practice of medicine solely on the ground of his criminal conviction, and this decision
was sustained by the New York courts. Reasoning from the state's
"substantially plenary power to-fix the terms of admission,"' 66 and
relying on an elaborate state procedure that provided wide discretion for mitigation but in no way precluded discipline on the
bare record of any criminal conviction, the Court in Barsky upheld
the suspension against fourteenth amendment attack. The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice
Black, x67 could have been anticipated. But even for Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, an ardent champion of deference to factual determinations by state agencies, 6 ' the Court's decision was more than could
be stomached in silence.
It is one thing .. .to recognize the freedom which the Constitution wisely leaves to the States in regulating the professions.
It is quite another thing, however, to sanction a State's deprivation
or partial destruction of a man's professional life on grounds having
no possible relation to fitness, intellectual or moral, to pursue his
165. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).

166. Many opinions in disciplinary cases have analogized the misconduct justifying
expulsion from the bar to the misconduct justifying denial of admission. See, e.g.,
Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 152 At. 292 (1930) ; State ex rel. Sorensen
v. Scoville, 123 Neb. 457, 243 N.W. 269 (1932) ; Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722,
"31 (8th Cir. 1927) (concurring opinion). The analogy holds only to a point. A greater
degree of generalization may be permitted in the admission cases because the applicant
is unable to rely on the persuasive evidence of a record in practice. Also, the applicant's
interest in being a member of the bar may usually be regarded as somewhat less
than that of a current practitioner.
167. 347 U.S. at 472.
168. See, e.g., the statement of his philosophy by Justice Frankfurter in Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (concurring opinion), quoted in
note 172 infra. But in Schware, as in Barsky, Justice Frankfurter found the state's
determination wholly lacking in rational justification.
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profession. Implicit in the grant of discretion to a State's medical
board is the qualification that it must not exercise its supervisory
powers on arbitrary, whimsical or irrational considerations. A license
cannot be revoked because a man is redheaded or because he was
divorced, except for a calling, if such there be, for which redheadedness or an unbroken marriage may have some rational bearing. If
a State licensing agency lays bare its arbitrary action, or if a State law
explicitly allows it to act arbitrarily, that is precisely the kind of
State action which the Due Process Clause forbids. 169

The majority's approach in Barsky, if good law, would in practice allow states to ignore the constitutional premise of equality
of punishment. If a physician may be singled out for what can only
be explained as special punishment, so may a lawyer. But it seems
certain that the Barsky decision was so far beyond the boundaries
of historic and contemporary constitutional debate that it must be
considered an unfortunate aberration.
In those bar admission cases of the present decade that have not
been complicated by the state's use of short-cuts to findings of unfitness, 170 a new majority within the Court has demonstrated a
169. 347 U.S. at 470. Justice Frankfurter's language harks back to Ex parte Wall,
107 U.S. 265 (1883), in which Mr. Justice Field observed with reference to the discipline of attorneys that
it is not for every moral offense which may leave a stain upon character
that courts can summon an attorney to account. Many persons, eminent at the
bar, have been chargeable with moral delinquencies which were justly a cause
of reproach to them; some have been frequenters of the gaming-table, some
have been dissolute in their habits, some have been indifferent to their
pecuniary obligations, some have wasted estates in riotous living, some have
been engaged in broils and quarrels disturbing the public peace; but for none
of these things could the court interfere and summon the attorney to answer,
and if his conduct should not be satisfactorily explained, proceed to disbar him.
107 U.S. at 306-07 (dissenting opinion).
170. The "short-cut" cases are Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36
(1961), and In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), in which the Court upheld denial
of admission to the bar solely because the applicants had refused to answer-on first
amendment grounds-bar committee questions concerning present or past membership
in the Communist Party. That these cases cannot be reconciled on principle with the
Court's more recent decisions in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), and
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), both discussed at text pp. 331-34
supra, is demonstrated in the following cogent analysis of the automatic exclusion rule:
Since the automatic rule actually operates to make refusal an independent
ground for rejection, it mutt be regarded as a substantiqve criterion for distinguishing between applicants. ...
The issue then is whether the rule provides a rational criterion for
classifying applicants to the bar. We submit that it does not; it discriminates
between applicants on grounds perversely unrelated to their character and
intellectual integrity. The automatic rule means that an applicant, regardless of
the strength of the rest of his record, can be denied simply because he refuses
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greater willingness to scrutinize state findings. Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners,' 7' a five-to-three decision, reversed a determination by the New Mexico Supreme Court that Schware had failed to
establish his "good moral character." Looking behind this stated
ground for disqualification to the evidence upon which the state
relied, Mr. Justice Black said the following:
The State contends that even though the use of aliases, the arrests,
and the membership in the Communist Party would not justify exclusion of petitioner from the New Mexico bar if each stood alone,
when all three are combined his exclusion was not unwarranted. We
cannot accept this contention. In the light of petitioner's forceful
showing of good moral character, the evidence upon which the State
relies-the arrests for offenses for which petitioner was neither tried
nor convicted, the use of an assumed name many years ago, and membership in the Communist Party during the 1930's-cannot be
said to raise substantial doubts about his present good moral characto answer on principle a question he deems improper. If, however, we take
the conscientious objector stance seriously-and there is much in American
history to suggest that we should-the rule can only operate to prefer applicants who are willing to answer over those who on principle are not. But
among those who will answer must be some insensitive to the possible impropriety of the question and many sensitive to it but persuaded to swallow
their indignation in order to be admitted; whereas on the other side, assuming good faith, we have those who have this much courage in their convictions. The argument, therefore, is that the automatic rule is arbitrary in that
it prefers the servile and insensitive to the courageous-and all under the
rubric of a proceeding to determine good moral character.
Kalvan & Steffen, supra note 159, at 185-86. (Emphasis by Kalven & Steffen.)
In Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), the Court upheld the application of a
refusal-to-answer-per-se rule to disbar an attorney who had properly claimed the
privilege against self-incrimination in a judicial investigation of "ambulance chasing."
It appears unlikely that the authority of the Cohen decision will survive the Court's
recent holdng in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), that "the Fifth Amendment's
exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against abridgement by the States." 378 U.S. at 6. In Malloy, the Court
made the further observation that
The Court . . . has rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a 'watered-down, subjective version of the individual
guarantees of the Bill of Rights' . . . . If Cohen v'. Hurley . . . and Adamson
v'. California . . . suggest such an application of the privilege against selfincrimination, that suggestion cannot survive recognition of the degree to
which the T'wining view of the privilege has been eroded. . . . [Citations
omitted.]
In Griffin v. California, 85 Sup. Ct. 1229 (1965), the Court struck down a provision
in the California constitution permitting comment by the prosecution on a criminal
defendant's failure to testify. Significantly, in terms of the Cohen decision, su/ra, the
Court condemned the comment rule because "it cuts down on the privilege by making
its assertion costly." 85 Sup. Ct. at 1233.
171. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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justifies a
ter. There is no evidence in the record which rationally
172
finding that Schware was morally unfit to practice law.
17
In the companion case, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,
Justice Black, writing for the majority, again looked to the evidence
claimed to support exclusion under the California requirements
that the applicant not advocate "overthrow of the government of
the United States or California by unconstitutional means" and that
he be of "good moral character." In the absence of a state rule disqualifying an applicant solely because he refused to answer bar committee questions, the record as a whole (including good-faith refusals, on first amendment grounds, to answer questions concerning past or present membership in the Communist Party) did not
state's adverse determinations concernfor Justice Black justify the
74
ing character and loyalty.

172. Id. at 246-47. Although concurring in the result because of the New Mexico
court's "dogmatic" reliance on Schware's membership in the Communist Party some
fifteen years before, Justice Frankfurter expressed a limited view of the Court's role
in these cases:
Of course, legislation laying down general conditions of an arbitrary or discriminatory character may, like other legislation, fall afoul of the Fourteenth
A very different question is presented when this Court is
Amendment ....
asked to review the exercise of judgment in refusing admission to the bar
in in individual case, such as we have here.
It is beyond this Court's function to act as overseer of a particular result
of the procedure established by a particular State for admission to its bar.
No doubt satisfaction of the requirement of moral character involves an exercise of delicate judgment on the part of those who reach a conclusion, having
heard and seen the applicant for admission, a judgment of which it may be
said as it was of 'many honest and sensible judgments' in a different context that it expresses 'an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and
sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions; impressions which may lie
beneath consciousness without losing their worth.' . . . Especially in this
realm it is not our business to substitute our judgment for the State's judgment-for it is the State in all the panoply of its powers that is under review
when the action of its Supreme Court is under review.
353 U.S. at 248.
173. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
174. In his opinion in this case, Konigsberg I, Justice Black emphasized:
There is nothing in the California statutes, the California decisions, or even in
the Rules of the Bar Committee, which has been called to our attention, that
suggests that failure to answer a Bar Examiner's inquiry is, ipso facto, a basis
for excluding an applicant from the Bar, irrespective of how overwhelming
is his showing of good character or loyalty or how flimsy are the suspicions
of the Bar Examiners.
353 U.S. at 260-61. On remand, the California Supreme Court again referred Konigsberg's case to the bar committee, and that committee conducted a further hearing. At
the hearing, though warned that failure to answer material questions would of itself
be cause for exclusion, Konigsberg persisted in his refusal to answer questions concerning membership in the Communist Party. The California Supreme Court, by a
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divided vote, refused to review the denial of Konigsberg's application. Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California, 52 Cal. 2d 769, 344 P.2d 777 (1959). The United States Supreme Court, with four Justices dissenting, affirmed. 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Konigsberg
11).
Reference has previously been made to the constitutional flaw in the refusal-toanswer-per-se rule. See note 170 supra. Remaining for present consideration is the
question whether a state may, as was arguably done in Konigsberg II, apply to a pending proceeding a freshly-minted rule of exclusion. If the rule bears no substantial relationship to fitness for practice, and applies to past conduct, the application of the
new rule may be attacked directly under the ex post facto clause. See note 73 supra.
Assuming, however, that the requisite relationship is present (as it would have been in
Morris if the discipline had been based only on Morris' driving under the influence),
can there be any objection to retroactive application? And if an objection exists, does
it assume constitutional dimensions? Justice Peters of the California Supreme Court,
who dissented in Konigsberg I1, apparently would answer both questions in the
affirmative. Referring to what he regarded as the bar committee's adoption of the per
se rule by the simple device of warning Konigsberg, he said:
Rules for admission to practice law are not to be adopted in this cavalier
fashion. The only rules passed by the Legislature provide that the applicant
must be of good moral character, and must not advocate the forceful overthrow. There is no rule about failing to answer. If California is to adopt
a new rule relating to failure to answer questions, such rule or statute should
be adopted in the manner rules and statutes are normally adopted. Here the
so-called 'rule' was adopted in the middle of a proceeding as an afterthought simply to justify the actions of the Bar Committee in refusing to
certify Konigsberg for admission. To sanction such a procedure is not only
unfair but, in my opinion, a denial of due process and equal protection.
344 P.2d at 785. A similar position was taken by Justice Black in dissenting from the
action of the Supreme Court affirming Konigsberg 11. 366 U.S. at 57-59. On the other
hand, Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in Konigsberg II, disagreed that the
per se rule was adopted in California for the first time on remand following Konigsberg 1. 366 U.S. at 47 n.9. Further, he rejected the contention that California could not
constitutionally take action to exclude Konigsberg after the Supreme Court's decision
in Konigsberg I. It was Justice Harlan's view that
in the absence of the slightest indication of any purpose on the part of the
State to evade the Court's prior decision, principles of finality protecting the
parties to this state litigation are, within broad limits of fundamental fairness, solely the concern of California law. Such limits are broad even in a
criminal case . . . . In this instance they certainly have not been transgressed
by the State's merely taking further action in this essentially administrative
type of proceeding.
366 U.S. at 44.
Concerning the problem of creation and retroactive application of a new rule in the
same case, particularly as it may have been present in Morris because of the adoption
of a standard broader than moral turpitude, see note 73 supra, Justice Harlan's characterization of proceedings involving exclusion from the bar as "essentially administrative" is significant, for an analogous problem of retroactive law-making has existed
for some time in the field of administrative law. 2 Davis, Administrative Law §§ 17.07,
17.08 (1958). The landmark decision in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947),
and other decisions have established the authority of regulatory agencies to carry out
their administrative functions by attaching new consequences to past conduct, despite
the disappointment of substantial reliance interests of the regulated parties. Where,
as in Morris, the reliance interest has been weak because the party's past conduct
amounted to the intentional violation of a preexisting legal duty (for Morris, driving
under the influence), the retroactive application has caused little difficulty. See NLRB
v. Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1960), distinguishing NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson
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Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952). No reliance interest would seem to have been
present in Konigsberg II because the applicant was given the opportunity to answer
the questions after the per se rule had been announced by the bar committee.
Yet, a troublesome problem remains with regard to the simultaneous creation and
application of rules in the administrative law cases and in disciplinary proceedings.
The problem is one of providing a reasonable opportunity, before application, for
critical appraisal of a new rule by those who will be affected. Baker, Policy by Rule
or Ad Hoc Approach-Which Should It Ber, 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 658, 664 (1957).
Fairness and wisdom in law-making call for such an opportunity and further for the
chance to present to the law-maker a reasoned argument objecting to the proposed
rule. The legislative process obviously affords opportunity for widespread study and
criticism of proposed legislation. A similar opportunity is provided affected parties
under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001
to 1011 (1958)) with regard to formally proposed rules (§4(a), (b), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1003(a), (b)) and adopted rules that have not yet become effective (§4(c), (d), 5
U.S.C. § 1003(c), (d)). See 1 Davis, op. cit. supra, at § 6.07.
While retroactive rule-making in the administrative law decisions has been defended by analogy to common law cases departing from the doctrine of stare decisis
(2 Davis, op. cit supra, at § 17.07), the analogy does not seem to fit the circumstances
of Morris. Today, judicial abandonment of a line of precedent is almost invariably
preceded by a substantial body of professional criticism advocating a different result.
Perhaps the opportunity for this consideration of an alternative solution stems from
the fact that the new doctrine is itself usually derived from previously announced
judicial principles and policies. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process 587-89 (tent. ed. 1958).
With respect to Morris, the seemingly single-minded (albeit misleading) attachment
of the enacted rules to the moral turpitude standard for discipline based on nonprofessional misconduct provided little basis for consideration of alternative criteria
prior to the actual Morris proceeding. Once the proceeding had begun, the policy
issues became so bound up with the future of the particular lawyer that it was
probably too late for the court to submit a broader standard to the bar for professional
criticism before it was applied to Morris. But cf. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking
or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921,
931 (1965).
Apart from the question of inherent judicial power, the supreme court in Morris
did at least nod in the direction of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-1 (1953), which provides:
The Supreme Court of the state of New Mexico shall, by rules promulgated
from time to time, define and regulate the practice of law within the state
of New Mexico. The Supreme Court shall cause such rules to be printed and
distributed to all members of the bar, to applicants for admission, and to
all courts within the state of New Mexico and the same shall not become
effective until thirty (30) days after the same shall have been made ready
for distribution and so distributed.
The terms of this statute recognize in two ways the importance of a reasonable opportunity for critical evaluation of disciplinary rules before they are applied. First,
it is clear that the court is to proceed by enacted rules and not on an ad hoc basis.
Second, the rules are to be disseminated to all members of the bar, and, like the federal
Administrative Procedure Act, supra, a period of time for critical evaluation is specified before the rules are to be effective. The New Mexico Supreme Court complied with
these requirements when the 1960 rules were promulgated. See note 5 supra. Had the
supreme court, in its 1960 rules or in any subsequent rules, abandoned the traditional
moral turpitude standard in favor of a broader rule that would more clearly have
comprehended Morris' conduct, it cannot be known whether there would have been
the kind of widespread criticism that would have impelled the court to undertake
a revision. Nor should one categorically deny the court power to take action without
notice where only prospective action would be "contrary to the public interest." See
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Public Reaction to Misconduct: The Need for Dispassionate
Appraisal

To this point it has been assumed that because discipline for nonprofessional misconduct cannot be justified as punishment, it can
only be justified as a means to secure a competent bar. This, of
course, overlooks the frequent assertions by courts and commentators that a principal purpose of discipline of lawyers is the protection of the reputation of the courts and the legal profession ;175
indeed, the publicity given a particular act of misconduct has on occasion been deemed significant. 176 One commentator has recommended that discipline be imposed for "conduct unbecoming a lawyer and a gentleman.' '1 77 A few courts have avoided applying the
moral turpitude standard, with its stigma of depravity, by relying
upon Canon 29 of the American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics: "[The lawyer] should strive at all times to uphold
the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession . ...
The use of these various criteria indicates a genuine apprehension
of a danger to the administration of justice that would result from
a failure to take disciplinary action when misconduct arouses public
hostility or contempt. The danger thus perceived, viewed in the
abstract, cannot be minimized. A judicial system could hardly be
expected to bear up under the strain of coercing enforcement of its
every process and judgment. Because public confidence in the ability
and willingness of the courts to reach just results undoubtedly
promotes voluntary cooperation with judicial procedures, this conAdministrative Procedure Act, supra, at § 4. Here, the certainty and seriousness of the
unfitness should be the predominant considerations.
Nonetheless, the preference should always be in favor of prospective application.
See Camp v. Herzog, 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952). In general, rules governing
discipline should not be applied without prior notice to the bar, through the rule-making procedure if possible, or if not, through an only prospectively operative adjudication. See State v. Bunge, 20 Wis. 2d 493, 122 N.W.2d 369 (1963) ; cf. In re Gorsuch,
76 S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1956).
175. See, e.g., Wood. v. State ex rel. Boykin, 45 Ga. App. 783, 165 S.E. 908 (1932)
In re Wells, 293 Ky. 205, 168 S.W.2d 733 (1943) ; In re McMullin, 370 S.W.2d 151 (Mo.
1963) ; In re Renehan, 19 N.M. 640, 145 Pac. 111 (1914). See also Drinker, Legal Ethics
44-46 (1953) ; Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses That Justify
Disbarment, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 9, 23 (1935) ; Note, 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 487, 493-94
(1961).
176. Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 152 At. 292, 295 (1930).
177. Bradway, supra note 175, at 24-25.
178. See Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Bilinski, 177 Ohio St. 43, 201 N.E.2d 878 (1964)
State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Ablah, 348 P.2d 172 (Okla. 1959) ; In re Genser,
15 N.J. 600, 105 A.2d 829 (1954) ; State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis. 2d 38, 119 N.W.2d
412 (1963).
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fidence should be maintained, and, if possible, enhanced. With regard to the reputation of the bar, beyond the questions of professional economics and professional dignity, 17 lie the well-justified assumptions that legal services are of great value in the ordering of
individual and community affairs, and that full use of these services
requires public confidence in the skill and integrity of practitioners.
Mentioned earlier was the related, but distinct, problem that a particular attorney, if allowed to continue practicing, may become the
object of such public hostility that his client's interests will be jeopardized.
Before considering the constitutionality of imposing discipline
for non-professional misconduct on the basis of public hostility, the
dimensions of the hostility problem may realistically be narrowed.
It may be assumed that a state will adopt adequate procedures to
exclude from practice lawyers who are shown to be professionally
unfit. If the existence of such a mechanism is made widely knownas it should beX'S-public reaction based upon reasonable apprehensions about the quality of the judicial process and the general professional competence of the bar may be put aside. To the side may
also be placed public hostility to a particular client's case arising
from a belief that only an unfit lawyer could be found to take it.
The remaining sources of public dissatisfaction might be roughly
classified as follows:
(1) Suspicion resulting from unreasonable disagreement with
the efficacy of the appropriate disciplinary procedure in removing
unfit attorneys.
(2) Hostility generated by an undifferentiated belief that because
of the attorney's misconduct he is a "bad man" and those with
whom he associates-judges, other attorneys, and clients-must
also be bad men.' 8 '
179. Unless the attorney guilty of misconduct is to be branded an untouchable by
being barred from a wide area of economic activity, these factors cannot be given
much weight.
180. An extensive survey of public opinion concerning the legal profession undertaken by the Missouri bar revealed that only 66% of laymen who had used a lawyer,
and 54% of those who had not, knew that lawyers were required by law to practice
in accordance with a code of ethics. Missouri Bar & Prentice-Hall Survey 93 (1963).
181. While there is good reason to believe that public confidence in the legal profession and the administration of justice is not as high as one might wish, the most
recent and thorough-going study in this area does not single out non-professional misconduct by attorneys as a particularly important factor. On the other hand, professional
misconduct by attorneys and doubts regarding the machinery of justice do cause laymen considerable concern. See generally Missouri Bar & Prentice-Hall Survey (1963).
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(3) Frustration caused by the refusal of the attorney's associates
-judges, other attorneys, and clients-to agree that the attorney
82
should be punished by expulsion from the practice of law.
It is perhaps easiest to see the objectionable nature of discipline
based on the public's frustrated desire to inflict punishment. Discipline imposed to appease a demand for punishment cannot realistically be distinguished from punishment itself. This was clearly
perceived by Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in Kennedy v. Men8s
doza-Martinez.1
My Brother Stewart discerns . . . an affirmative instrument of
policy and not simply a sanction which must be classed as 'punishment.' The policy objective is thought to be the maintenance of troop
morale; a threat to that objective is thought to be the spectacle of
persons escaping a military-service obligation by flight; and expatriation of such persons is sustained as a demonstrative counter to that
threat. To my mind that would be 'punishment' in the purest sense;
it would be naked vengeance. Such an exaction of retribution would
not lose that quality because it was undertaken to maintain morale.
Indeed, it is only the significance of expatriation as retribution which
could render it effective to boost morale-the purpose which, to
the dissent, removes expatriation as here used from the realm of the

punitive. I do not perceive how expatriation so employed would
differ analytically from the stocks or the rack. Because such devices
may be calculated to shore up the convictions of the law-abiding by
demonstrating that the wicked will not go unscathed, they would not,
by the dissent's view, be punitive . . . . I cannot agree to any such
184
proposition ....
182. The magnitude of such public frustration should not be exaggerated. Because
public hostility in the form of a desire for retribution remains a significant ingredient
in determining the extent of criminal punishment, it would seem that if the lawyer's
non-professional misconduct is of the sort that will provoke a major outcry, the courts
will have responded by fixing a severe criminal sanction. A light sentence, or no sentence at all, may indicate that the court senses public sympathy for the particular offender or an attitude toward the offense approximating "there but for the grace of God
go I." The latter seems to be the common and quite reasonable public reaction to
prosecutions for motor vehicle homicide. See The President's Highway Safety Conference, Report of Committee on Laws and Ordinances 26 (1949) ; Karaba, Negligent
Homicide or Manslaughter:A Dilemma, 41 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 183 (1951). Additionally, certain unofficial sanctions may be applied by society. Thus, in a small town a
lawyer whose misconduct is objectionable may find an empty waiting room. In the
hectic atmosphere of the metropolis, the notoriety surrounding the lawyer's misconduct
may soon be dissipated, thus alleviating any public demand for punishment.
183. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
184. Id. at 189-90. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 109-10 (1958) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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If the equal protection clause forbids the infliction, under the guise
of discipline, of special punishment on lawyers for non-professional
misconduct, such unequal treatment cannot be justified by reference
to the unfortunate social consequences of frustrating a public demand for inequality. For example, the Supreme Court, in the field
of racial segregation, has held that equal treatment cannot be denied
because of possible civil disorder resulting from community hostility to desegregation.'
Nor would it appear that the other forms of public dissatisfaction
are entitled to constitutional recognition as the sole ground for imposing discipline for non-professional misconduct, without regard
to any determination of unfitness. At best it is hard to imagine that
Garland, Schware, or Konigsberg I would have been decided differently had the argument been advanced that substantial community dissatisfaction would result if the respective parties in those
cases were permitted to practice. Moreover, if public dissatisfaction
is to be given consideration at all, its weight must generally be
deemed slight when weighed against the attorney's interest in continuing to practice. Rarely could it be said that the public hostility
or suspicion presents a "clear and present danger to the administration of justice."' 8 6 Such a conclusion would be particularly hard to
reach when the public reaction is unreasonable. 8 7 Also to be considered are the powers available to courts to control sporadic manifestations of hostility in particular cases, or recalcitrance on the part
of losing parties. 8 8 Conversely, an attorney's interest in continuing
to practice would rarely be deemed of so little weight as to be sub185. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535-36 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917).

Gilliam, 196 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Va. 1961)

But see Wells v.

(upholding racial segregation in municipal

courtroom to preserve order), 60 Mich. L. Rev. 503.

186. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564-66 (1965) ; Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
575 (1962) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) ; cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 550-51 (1965) ; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).

187. Cf. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1958) (opinion of Brennan, J.)
Petitioner did not say Judge Wiig was corrupt or venal or stupid or incompetent. The public attribution of honest error to the judiciary is no cause for

professional discipline in this country. . . . It may be said that some of the
audience would infer improper collusion with the prosecution from a charge
of error prejudicing the defense. Some lay persons may not be able to imagine

legal error without venality or collusion, but it will not do to set our standards
by their reactions. We can indulge in no involved speculation as to petitioner's
guilt by reason of the imaginations of others.
Id. at 635.
188. Cf. Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851
(1948).

OCTrOBER, 1965]

NON-PROFESSIONAL

MISCONDUCT

ordinated to the threat of public suspicion or hostility. An attorney's
interest in practicing surely weighs more heavily than those activities
that may be constitutionally restricted to allay harmful public reaction, such as expressing an opinion on a pending case by demonstrating before the courthouse, 8 9 or using "fighting words,"' 90 or
19 2
undertaking "incitement to riot,"' 9 ' or libeling a racial minority.
It may be that only while an attorney is imprisoned is his interest so
slight as to be overborne by a concern for public reaction. Withal
the bar should be free of the reproach that the "jails are full of
'1 93
lawyers.'
III
SOME PROPOSALS FOR A SCHEME OF INDIVIDUALIZED DISCIPLINE

A.

The Determinationof Unfitness

Under the Constitution, an attorney may be disciplined for nonprofessional misconduct only upon an individualized determination
that he is unfit to continue in the practice of law. Each case must be
"considered individually on its merits, including mitigating circumstances involved and the previous standing and record of the attorney involved, and the court's appraisal of his future conduct in
the light of his past record.' u 94 To intelligently make such an appraisal, a court must ask two questions: (1) Does the misconduct
reveal some flaw in the attorney's personality that if manifested in
his professional activity would cause him to violate his obligations
to his clients, the courts, or fellow attorneys? (2) Is it likely that the
189. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
190. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
191. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
192. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
193. In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202, 204 (1946):
A member of the bar whose name remains on the roll is in a sense held out
by the Commonwealth, through the judicial department, as still entitled to confidence. A conviction of crime, especially of serious crime, undermines public
confidence in him. The average citizen would find it incongruous for the
Commonwealth on the one hand to adjudicate him guilty and deserving of
punishment, and then, on the other hand, while his conviction and liability to
punishment still stand, to adjudicate him innocent and entitled to retain his
membership in the bar.
Welansky had been sentenced to a term of 12-to-15 years in prison after his conviction of manslaughter for negligently causing the deaths of 492 persons in the
Cocoanut Grove nightclub fire; he was the owner of the nightclub.
194. Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Prear, 175 Ohio St. 543, 196 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1964). See
also Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 1927).
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deleterious personality trait will be carried over into the attorney's
professional life?
Regarding the assessment of personality from acts of misconduct,
one must deal at the outset with a possible argument that whatever the nature of the particular act, any deliberate violation of the
criminal law indicates the attorney's lack of respect for duly established rules of conduct.'1 5 And, as every lawyer knows, the practice
of law is hedged about by an extraordinary number of rules. Although the conduct involved in committing the crime of adultery'
or in manufacturing beer for home consumption during Prohibition 1 7 has no counterpart in professional practice, it may be claimed
that if the attorney is willing to place himself "above the law"'9 8
in one respect, he will be willing to violate the law in other areas,
including the area of professional activity. This picture of an adulterer as the compleat non-conformist is not very convincing. In the
absence of some persuasive evidence to the contrary, common experience would suggest that the rejection of a particular rule on
moral grounds does not imply a tendency to reject other rulesespecially those lacking specific moral content"'-on other grounds,
such as expediency or profit. 00 Nevertheless, it would be asserted
that grave dangers to the administration of justice are created even
by the presence of an attorney whose inclination toward disobedience is limited to sincere moral disagreement with particular laws.
Although the argument for universal obedience is more compelling
when applied to participation in the legal system than it is with regard to social life generally,2 ' it cannot be entirely accepted while
195. This argument would, of course, not apply to offenses that may be committed
inadvertently, e.g., many traffic offenses.
196. See Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 152 At. 292 (1930).
197. See Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927).
198. State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis. 2d 38, 119 N.W.2d 412, 416 (1963). See also
Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 152 Ad. 292, 295 (1930).
199. E.g., compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (20 days to answer complaint), with N.M.
Stat. Ann. §21-1-1(12) (30 days to answer complaint).
200. Cf. Wasserstrom, The Obligation To Obey the Law, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 780,
781, 795-96 (1963). The general respect for law of an attorney who has become involved in professional criminality is quite properly suspect. See, e.g., Underwood v.
Commonwealth, 105 S.W. 151 (Ky. 1907) (bootlegging) ;In re McNeese, 346 Mo. 425,
142 S.W.2d 33 (1940) (sale of opium) ;In re Okin, 272 App. Div. 607, 73 N.Y.S.2d 861
(1947) (brothel) ; In re Marsh, 42 Utah 186, 129 Pac. 411 (1913) (brothel). However,
the suspicion is not justified in the case of an attorney who correctly, or incorrectly
with good reason, believes his "business" to be legal. See In re Fischer, 231 App. Div.
193, 247 N.Y. Supp. 168 (1930) ; cf. Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir.
1927).
201. On the subject of "civil disobedience," see generally Wasserstrom, supra note
200.
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institutional techniques operate imperfectly. Assuming that an attorney remains faithful to the overriding objective of securing justice under law, the "administration of justice," in its broadest sense,
may profit by occasional and selective non-observance of specific
rules.

2 02

Among types of misconduct that do not, in themselves, suggest
personality defects that would impair an attorney's capacity to
properly discharge his professional duties should be included some
sexual offenses, for example, adultery,20 3 fornication,2 4 procurement
of an abortion for one's wife, 20 5 and homosexual relations with a
consenting adult; manufacture of beer for home consumption; 20 6
perpetration of an airline "bomb hoax" ;207 objection to military
service, conscientious or otherwise ;208 and encouragement to violate
conscription laws. 2 9 However, even sexual misconduct may tend to
show unfitness for practice if, the attorney has demonstrated contempt for his professional status by capitalizing on it to further
his wrongful activity, 210 and certain instances of bizarre sexual
behavior may be symptomatic of a more pervasive breakdown of
21
the attorney's self-respect. '
202. Cf. Wasserstrom, supra note 200, at 801-03. Situations in which non-observance
of specific rules might be justified are suggested by some facts appearing in In re
McMullin, 370 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Mo. 1963), and In re Eaton, 60 N.D. 580, 235 N.W. 587
(1931). For background on the Eaton episode, see Olson v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.,
58 N.D. 176, 225 N.W. 124 (1929).
203. Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 152 At. 292 (1930) ; cf. In re
Kienstra, 154 Wash. 153, 282 Pac. 221 (1929).
204. People ex rel. Black v. Smith, 290 II. 241, 124 N.E. 807 (1919) ; In re Wesler, 1
N.J. 573, 64 A.2d 880 (1949).
205. In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948).
206. Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927).
207. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Smith, 174 Ohio St. 452, 190 N.E.2d 267 (1963).
208. In re Pontarelli, 393 Ill. 310, 66 N.E.2d 83 (1949). Cf. In re Summers, 325 U.S.
561 (1945).
209. In re Margolis, 260 Pa. 206, 112 At. 478 (1921).
210. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 76 Ariz. 49, 258 P.2d 433 (1953) (county attorney consorted with prostitute he was "protecting"); In re Gould, 4 App. Div. 2d 174, 164
N.Y.S.2d 48 (1957) (assaulting girls answering bogus "help wanted" advertisements) ;
In re Simmons, 395 P.2d 1013 (Wash. 1964) (judge assaulted woman traffic offender
with intent to commit rape).
211. See, e.g., In re Hicks, 163 Okla. 29, 20 P.2d 896 (1933) ; In re Van Wyck, 207
Minn. 145, 290 N.W. 227 (1940).
Certain extreme instances of eccentric behavior may similarly indicate a general deterioration in the attorney's ability to control his conduct. See, e.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Ablah, 348 P.2d 172 (Okla. 1959) (innumerable harassing phone
calls, made anonymously to avenge social slight) ; cf. State ex rel. Nebraska Bar Ass'n
v. Rhodes, 177 Neb. 650, 131 N.W.2d 118 (1964) (attorney defending himself called
judges "kangaroos" and lay down in courtroom).
Apparently recognizing that discipline for non-professional misconduct is a matter
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Other forms of non-professional misconduct raise serious doubts
about an attorney's fitness for practice. Perjury,2 12 or the suborning
of perjury,2 13 by an attorney may reveal such a disregard for the
obligation to tell the truth under oath that he must be considered
unfit to participate in the administration of justice. Because an attorney is likely to be responsible for the money or property of his
215
214
or embezzlement or extortion,
clients, acts of larceny or theft

doubtless cast suspicion on the perpetrator's professional fitness.
An attorney's non-professional involvement in schemes designed
to defraud other private citizens 210 or governmental bodies 21 7 suggests a willingness to overreach his clients, their adversaries, and
others with whom he must deal in his practice. The professional
integrity of an attorney who, for a share of the proceeds, acts as
intermediary for thieves 218 or kidnappers 219 may understandably be
of fitness rather than punishment, courts generally have refused to excuse acts of misconduct on the ground that they resulted from alcoholism. E.g., Wood v. State ex rel.
Boykin, 45 Ga. App. 783, 165 S.E. 908 (1932) ; In re Wells, 293 Ky. 201, 168 S.W.2d
730 (1943) ; In re Osmond, 174 Okla. 561, 54 P.2d 319 (1935) ; In re McGarry, 68 N.M.
308, 361 P.2d 718 (1961) ; In re Evans, 94 S.C. 414, 78 S.E. 227 (1913). And at least
one court gives no weight to the claim that the misconduct was caused by mental illness. See In re Gould, 4 App. Div. 2d 174, 164 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1957) ; In re Bivona, 261
App. Div. 221, 25 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1941) ; In re Dubinsky, 256 App. Div. 102, 7 N.Y.S.2d
387 (1938).
While a tendency toward personal violence would fairly raise doubts concerning an
attorney's fitness for a profession that frequently involves him in adversary proceedings, most instances of violence by attorneys appear "situational." E.g., In re Rothrock,
16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940) ; State v. Metcalf, 204 Iowa 123, 214 N.W. 874
(1927) ; Smith v. State, 9 Tenn. (1 Yerg.) 228 (1829). See generally text pp. 357-58
infra.
212. In re Nearing, 16 App. Div. 2d 516, 229 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1962).
213. Florida Bar v. King, 174 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1965).
214. In re King, 232 Minn. 327, 45 N.W.2d 562 (1950) ; In re Lieb, 1 N.J. 567, 64
A.2d 880 (1949) ; In re Ross, 279 App. Div. 665, 108 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1951).
215. In re Lynch, 238 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1951) (embezzlement) ; State ex rel. Sorensen v. Scoville, 123 Neb. 457, 243 N.W. 269 (1932) (extortion).
216. Criminal convictions: In re Needham, 364 Il. 65, 4 N.E.2d 19 (1936) ; In re
McCarthy, 42 Mich. 71, 51 N.W. 963 (1879) ; In re Jacoby, 74 Ohio App. 147, 57 N.E.
2d 932 (1943). No criminal prosecutions: Mauer v. State Bar of California, 219 Cal.
271, 26 P.2d 14 (1933) ; In re Wilson, 79 Kan. 450, 100 Pac. 75 (1909) ; In re Stone,
334 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. 1960) ; In re Wells, 293 Ky. 201, 168 S.W.2d 730 (1943) ; In re
Chartoff, 16 App. Div. 2d 277, 227 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1962) ; In re Hunt, 14 App. Div. 2d
397, 221 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1961) ; In re Spier, 269 App. Div. 1058, 59 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1945) ;
In re Shapiro, 263 App. Div. 659, 34 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1942) ; In re Isaacs, 17 App. Div.
181, 158 N.Y. Supp. 403 (1916) ; In re Barnard, 59 Wash. 2d 912, 367 P.2d 26 (1961).
217. Fellner v. Bar Ass'n of Baltimore, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957) ; In re
Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 23 N.W.2d 4 (1946) ; In re Rotwein, 20 App. Div. 2d 428,
247 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1964) ; Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Prear, 175 Ohio St. 543, 196 N.E.2d 773
(1964) ; In re Bassett, 401 P.2d 33 (Ore. 1965).
218. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Jackson, 322 Ill. 618, 153 N.E. 621 (1926)
In re Osmond, 174 Okla. 561, 54 P.2d 319 (1935).
219. In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W.2d 672 (1933).
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questioned. Perhaps the most disturbing cases of non-professional
misconduct, to the extent that they may be so classified, are those
involving misfeasance in public office. 220 An attorney who degrades,
usually for private gain, a position of special trust and responsibilhave high
ity that he has voluntarily assumed cannot be thought to
2 21
regard for the bar's standards of professional conduct.
Only superficially resembling those previously noted acts of misconduct that are motivated by expectations of personal gain are
some cases of income tax evasion or of drawing checks on insufficient funds. Tax violations, alnong the most common causes for
disciplinary proceedings, have received curious treatment in the
courts. The Missouri Supreme Court, for example, has declared that
failure to file a federal income tax return is per se an offense involv222
ing moral turpitude and imposes long suspensions from practice.
220. A difficult question concerns the propriety of initiating disciplinary proceedings against a public office-holder under circumstances when the imposition of suspension may have the effect of removing him from office. Compare In re Strahl, 201 App.
Div. 729, 195 N.Y. Supp. 385 (1922), 'with In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N.W. 379
(1927). Because present occupancy of public office offers no assurance that such occupancy will continue, and because the public should be notified of the attorney's incompetence, disciplinary action should not be delayed during his incumbency. Nor is there
merit in the position that even if an official act demonstrates unfitness, it may not be
made the basis for discipline unless it was capable of commission by non-official attorneys. See In re Wehrman, 327 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1959) ; Note, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 811
(1960). Once the attorney has been suspended, the effect of the suspension on his holding of office must be determined by construction of the applicable statutes concerning
qualifications and removal from office (e.g., is bar membership expressly made a continuing qualification?). Whether other established removal procedures should be
deemed exclusive might also depend upon the nature of the misconduct (e.g., did it
amount to misfeasance in office?).
221. A number of cases involve the solicitation or acceptance of bribes. E.g., In re
Wilson, 76 Ariz. 49, 258 P.2d 433 (1953) ; In re Ransom, 18 App. Div. 2d 431, 239
N.Y.S.2d 990 (1963) ; In re Crum, 55 N.D. 876, 215 N.W. 682 (1927) ; In re Chernoff,
344 Pa. 527, 26 A.2d 335 (1942) ; Schoolfield v. Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 209 Tenn. 304,
353 S.W.2d 401 (1961) ; cf. State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 At. 274 (1914). Other forms
of misfeasance may similarly suggest a lack of fidelity to the obligations of office, e.g.,
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Gorman, 346 II. 432, 178 N.E. 880 (1931) (slander), but some instances of nonfeasance may not, e.g., In re Graves, 347 Mo. 49, 146
S.W.2d 555 (1941).
Improper conduct in seeking judicial office may indicate a low regard for the role
of the judiciary in the legal system. E.g., Ex parte Grace, 244 Ala. 267, 13 So. 2d 178
(1943) ; In re Strahl, 201 App. Div. 729, 195 N.Y. Supp. 385 (1922); In re Gorsuch,
76 S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1956). Participation in the unlawful removal of a prisoner from jail for the purpose of lynching him, Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883),
or running the prisoner out of town, State ex rel. McLaughlin v. Graves, 73 Ore. 331,
144 Pac. 484 (1914), may imply an absence of respect for the legal system as a whole.
See also In re Malmin, 364 II. 164, 4 N.E.2d ill (1936) (attempt to extort from the
Secretary of the Interior the governorship of Virgin Islands).
222. In re Lurkins, 374 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1964) ; In re McMullin, 370 S.W.2d 151
(Mo. 1963).
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But the supreme court of a neighboring state, Kentucky, and most
courts that have passed upon the question have held that absent an
intent to defraud, failure to file does not involve moral turpitude.223
Without a finding of fraud, the Kentucky court now seems content
to dismiss a case without any disciplinary action whatever ;224 other
courts in this situation seem impelled to find some ground for discipline, though the ground be unconstitutional 225 and the discipline
slight.2 26 The latter courts seem to sense that in terms of fitness to
practice the moral turpitude standard, with its quest for fraudulent
intent, is inadequate. Yet, their opinions have failed to define the
deleterious personality traits that may be indicated by the failure to
file an income tax return, even when the offense is not characterized
by fraud. In some instances the failure to file is admittedly motivated
by lack of funds to pay the tax when it is due ;227 an attorney who
seeks to "cover up" rather than "face up" to such problems may do
great harm to the interests of his clients.228 Similarly, the attorney
who "borrows" money or pays preexisting debts by writing checks
on insufficient funds must realize that he is merely postponing the
day of reckoning. 229 Other tax cases involving failure to file reveal
the kind of disorganized behavior with regard to continuing responsibilities that would alarm any client whose affairs demanded
systematic attention.230 It is not to be suggested that in disciplinary
223. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Brown, 302 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. 1957) ; Kentucky
State Bar Ass'n v. McAfee, 301 S.W.2d 899 (1957). The opinions in both Kentucky
cases indicate that each attorney involved had received a prison sentence in the criminal trial, but it is not clear whether these sentences had been served. See also In re
Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954) ; Baker v. Miller, 236 Ind. 20, 138 N.E.2d
145 (1956) ; State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis. 2d 38, 119 N.W.2d 412 (1963); In re McShane, 122 Vt. 175 A.2d 508 (1961).
224. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Brown, supra note 223.
225. See, e.g., Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Bilinski, 177 Ohio St. 43, 201 N.E.2d 878
(1964) ; State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis. 2d 38, 119 N.W.2d 412 (1963).
226. See, e.g., State v. Roggensack, supra note 225; In re McShane, 122 Vt. 442,
175 A.2d 508 (1961).
227. See, e.g., In re McMullin, 370 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. 1963).
228. Cf. Costigan v. Adkins, 18 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
229. See, e.g., In re Belluscio, 38 N.J. 355, 184 A.2d 864 (1962) ; In re McGarry,
68 N.M. 308, 361 P.2d 718 (1961) ; In re Chartoff, 16 App. Div. 2d 277, 227 N.Y.S.2d
578 (1962) ; In re Dubinsky, 256 App. Div. 102, 7 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1938) ; State ex rel.
Joseph v. Mannix, 133 Ore. 329, 288 Pac. 507 (1930). See also MacDonald, A Psychiatric Study of Check Offenders, 116 Am. J. Psychiatry 438, 441 (1959):
The incurably optimistic overindulged oral character like Mr. Micawber is always expecting something to turn up 'I have signed checks because I was
sure my financial position would take a turn for the better before they were
due for presentation.' . . .
230. See, e.g., In re Lurkins, 374 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1964) ; State v. Bunge, 20 Wis.
2d 493, 122 N.W.2d 369 (1963) ; State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis. 2d 38, 119 N.W.2d 412
(1963) ; In re McShane, 122 Vt. 442, 175 A.2d 508 (1961).
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cases judges should attempt to function as psychiatrists, but courts
that have heretofore been willing to characterize an attorney's personality as "depraved" should not be reluctant to describe it as "disorganized."
Finally, brief attention may be directed to cases like In re Morris23' and In re Welansky3 2 in which an attorney's misconduct has
caused unintentional injury or death. Because the tragic results do
not reflect on the attorney's personality,2 33 investigation must focus
upon the causative behavior. One possibility in these cases is that
the attorney has merely acted inadvertently. Another possibility is
that the attorney has exhibited reckless disregard for the interests
of others, in the sense that he has consciously ignored apprehended
risks.23 4 Regardless of the manner in which simple inattention should
be treated in the criminal law, it is clear that the trait is not one to
be prized in a member of the bar; and the greater and more obvious
the risk that escaped the attorney's attention, the greater the danger
his obtuseness may create in practice. But putting aside those attorneys whose non-professional misconduct manifests utter stupidity,
the reckless attorney, more than his careless colleague, jeopardizes
the interests of those who must rely on him professionally. Therefore, in the case of reckless misconduct a court should demand special assurance that this personality trait will not be carried over into
the attorney's professional life.
The nature of a court's task in predicting whether a personality
trait revealed in non-professional misconduct will infect the attorney's professional activities can best be illustrated, perhaps, by
reference to the facts of two disciplinary proceedings in which the
attorneys involved were suspended from practice. In re Nearing23 5
arose from a 1958 investigation by a New York grand jury of the
celebrated television quiz program, "Twenty-One." Before the
grand jury, Vivienne Nearing, an attorney and erstwhile winning
contestant, initially testified to the bona fides of the program. But
in a second appearance before the grand jury she admitted that the
program had been a harmless hoax on the viewing public. Upon her
plea of guilty, Nearing was convicted of second degree perjury.
231.

74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (1964).

232. 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946). See note 193 tupra.
233.
234.

See text p. 311 supra.
In Massachusetts, a manslaughter conviction

could

be obtained without a

showing of recklessness as it is defined in the text. Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316
Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944).

235. 16 App. Div. 2d 516, 229 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1962).
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Subsequently, she was charged with "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" and suspended from practice for six months
by the appellate division of the supreme court. Ignoring the court's
apparent concern for public reaction, 23 6 and looking entirely to the
question of Nearing's fitness, her failure to be truthful under oath
should be considered "situational" and not likely to recur in her
professional activity. Non-professional perjury has its counterpart
in the professional area, but the situation that Nearing was attempting to hide bears no resemblance to any that she would foreseeably
encounter in practice.2 37 Thus, judged solely by her act of misconduct, the likelihood that Nearing would commit perjury in her professional activity does not appear substantially more probable that
it would be for an attorney who had not been so involved.233
3 9 involved a criminal conThe second case, In re McMullin,"
viction for failure to file federal income tax returns. Following a
three-month period of imprisonment, the Missouri Supreme Court
suspended McMullin indefinitely for the commission of an offense
involving moral turpitude, though leave to apply for readmission
after three years was granted. McMullin candidly admitted that
he had not filed because he did not have the money to pay the taxes
when the returns were due, so his misconduct did not arise from the
sort of extraordinary web of personal circumstances that marked
the Nearing case. Yet, the fact that McMullin had obtained official
extensions of time for filing his returns belies any serious design to
conceal his tax liability; his conduct would be better characterized as
a lack of careful attention to the resolution of his tax problems.
Could unfitness reasonably be inferred from this single act of mis236. 229 N.Y.S.2d at 569:
[T]he protection of the public involves something more than the application
of sanctions to the individual involved. It is accomplished through notice to
the profession that certain conduct will not be tolerated and is thereby an assurance to the public that, as far as known, certain taints do not exist, because, if discovered, they would be eradicated . . . . [Citations omitted.]
237. In contrast, the lack of funds to pay non-professional obligations, which may
result in a failure to file tax returns or in the writing of bad checks, see text p. 356
supra, may often have its counterpart in practice, see note 228 supra and accompanying
text.
238. Other factors tending to indicate that Nearing's non-professional misconduct
would not be duplicated in practice were her prior outstanding professional record,
see note 243 infra, and her subsequent extraordinary candor and full cooperation in
the investigation, see note 244 infra. For other instances of "situational" non-professional misconduct, see Florida Bar v. King, 174 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1965) ; In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948) ; State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis. 2d 38, 119 N.W.2d
412 (1963).
239. In re McMullin, 370 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. 1963).
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conduct? Additional facts appearing in the McMullin opinion sup240
port a negative answer. For from suggesting habitual carelessness,
McMullin's private life before and after his misconduct reflects both
vitality and industry. 24' And his previous professional record, though
shamefully deprecated by the judge presiding at his criminal trial,242
suggests exceptional diligence in handling his client's affairs. 24 Any
remaining doubts concerning McMullin's willingness to confront his
responsibilities should have been assuaged by his plea of guilty to
the criminal charge and his remarkable act of voluntarily submitting himself to the Missouri court for the imposition of appropriate
discipline.244 Obviously, predictions about future professional con240. Many decisions imposing discipline have emphasized the habitual nature of
the attorney's misconduct. See, e.g., Fellner v. Bar Ass'n of Baltimore, 213 Md. 243, 131
A.2d 729 (1961) ; In re Belluscio, 38 N.J. 355, 184 A.2d 864 (1962) ; In re Dubinsky,
256 App. Div. 102, 7 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1938) ; State ex rel. Joseph v. Mannix, 133 Ore.
329, 288 Pac. 507 (1930) ; In re Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527, 26 A.2d 335 (1942) ; cf. Marsh
v. State Bar of California, 2 Cal. 2d 75, 39 P.2d 403 (1934) (misconduct following
earlier discipline for similar conduct) ; Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Prear, 175 Ohio St. 543,
196 N.E.2d 775 (1964) (misconduct while on criminal probation for similar misconduct) ; In re Brown, 64 S.D. 87, 264 N.W. 521 (1936) (misconduct during suspension
for similar conduct). With respect to habitual careless driving, research has disclosed
a significant correlation with lack of responsibility in the careless driver's other affairs. Tillman, A Person Drives as He Lives, 1959 Ins. L.J. 171.
241. In some decisions the general character of the attorney's private life has apparently been given weight in determining the magnitude of discipline. See, e.g., In re
Fischer, 231 App. Div. 193, 247 N.Y. Supp. 168 (1930) ; State ex rel. McLaughlin v.
Graves, 73 Ore.'331, 144 Pac. 484 (1914) ; In re Evans, 94 S.C. 414, 78 S.E. 227
(1913). But see Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 152 At. 292 (1930) ; In re
Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948).
242. 370 S.W.2d at 152-53. One might well conclude that public comment by the
judiciary on the low professional status of attorneys who represent criminal defendants
(coupled with the gratuitous advice that such attorneys should charge higher fees)
does more harm to the legal profession and the administration of justice than the
presence at the bar of an attorney who has failed to file some income tax returns.
243. In some decisions the character of an attorney's professional record has apparently been given weight in determining the magnitude of discipline. See, e.g.,
Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927) ; In re Crum, 55 N.D. 876, 215
N.W. 682 (1927) ; In re Rotwein, 20 App. Div. 2d 428, 247 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1964) ; State
ex rel. McLaughlin v. Graves, 73 Ore. 331, 144 Pac. 484 (1914) ; State v. Roggensack,
19 Wis. 2d 38, 119 N.W.2d 412 (1963). But see Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn.
263, 152 At. 292 (1930).
244. Compare the conduct of the attorney in a later Missouri case, In re Lurkins,
374 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1964).
The attorney's behavior following his act of misconduct has been considered in a
number of decisions. Compare, e.g., In re Wells, 293 Ky. 205, 168 S.W.2d 733 (1943)
(bar committee recommendation of discipline not opposed). In re Graves, 347 Mo. 146
S.W.2d 555 (1941) (submitted voluntarily for discipline) ; In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191,
75 N.W.2d 644 (1956) (apology for unjustified political attack) ; In re McShane, 122
Vt. 442, 175 A.2d 508 (1961) (cooperation with tax authorities) ; State v. Bunge, 20
Wis. 2d 493, 122 N.W.2d 369 (1963) (began to have tax returns prepared), quith, e.g.,
In re Wells, 293 Ky. 201, 168 S.W. 730 (1943) (no restitution); Fellner v. Bar Ass'n
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duct cannot be made with certainty, but it scarcely seems that the
court would have been taking a substantial risk had it determined
that McMullin was fit to continue in practice.
B.

The Relationship of DisciplinaryProceedingsto the
Processes of the CriminalLaw
1. Proceedings in the Absence of a Prior Criminal Conviction.

Misconduct That Is Not Criminal. The discussion in the previous
subsection concerning grounds for a determination of unfitness
draws no distinction between non-professibnal misconduct that is
punishable under the criminal law, whether or not actually punished,
and misconduct that is not criminal. In estimating fitness, such a
distinction would not generally be justified. Yet, when the conduct
providing an alleged basis for discipline arises from a private business transaction, its non-criminal nature may be of significance. Consider, first, the situation of an attorney who, pursuant to a non-professional agency agreement, receives certain sums of money to be
expended for specified purposes. If the attorney retains the money
for his personal benefit, the violation of his fiduciary obligation
would carry many of the same grave implications about his professional fitness as does misfeasance in public office. 245 Suppose, however, that the attorney properly pays out the moneys received, and
his "misconduct" consists only of failing to account for the funds
with the special promptness and precision required of attorneys
in handling professionally the funds of others.240 So long as the circumstances made it clear that the attorney was not acting in his
professional capacity, 47 his conduct was appropriate for the role
he had assumed. Thus, one could not fairly infer that upon reasof Baltimore, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957) (no admission of guilt in face of overwhelming evidence); In re Shapiro, 236 App. Div. 659, 34 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1942) (no
restitution) ; In re Cohen, 169 App. Div. 544, 155 N.Y. Supp. 517 (1915) (flight from
jurisdiction) ; State ex rel. Joseph v. Mannix, 133 Ore. 329, 288 Pac. 507 (1930) (no
restitution).
245.

See text at note 221 supra.

246. See In re Genser, 15 N.J. 600, 105 A.2d 829 (1954). For the proposition that
an attorney is subject to a special standard in accounting for funds, the court in
Genser cites Canon 11 of the ABA Canons and the following language from In re
Honig, 10 N.J. 74, 89 A.2d 411, 413 (1952):
'All fiduciaries are held to a duty of fairness, good faith and fidelity, but
an attorney is held to an even higher degree of responsibility in these matters
than is required of all others.'
105 A.2d at 832.
247. Apparently this was not the case in In re Genser, supra note 246.
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suming his role as attorney he would not adjust his conduct to conform to the higher professional standard. Compare with this situation the troublesome case of an attorney who willfully breaches an
"arm's length" commercial contract. 24 Although no fiduciary duty
is involved, such conduct may differ only in degree from a criminal
act of fraud in its overtones of danger to those whose interests are
professionally enmeshed with the attorney's. But an argument can
be made that because simple breach of contract is not subject to
criminal sanctions, such conduct should be considered an acceptable,
though undesirable, concomitant of business relations. In this respect, breach of contract may be said to resemble an agent's failure
to render a prompt and meticulous account and, therefore, to offer
little evidence of professional unfitness. Considerations of similar
import may account in part for the paucity of reported disciplinary
249
proceedings involving breach of contract.
Criminal Misconduct That Has Not Been Prosecuted. The reported cases indicate that in recent years disciplinary proceedings
for non-professional misconduct have seldom, if ever, been initiated
prior to the disposition of an anticipated or pending criminal charge.
One good reason for such delay may be seen in the observation of
Lord Denman that "we should be cautious of putting parties in a
situation where, by answering, they might furnish a case against
themselves, on an indictment to be afterwards preferred." 250 A related reason, given by Mr. Justice Field dissenting in Ex parte
Wall,25'1 is that "to disbar an attorney for an indictable offence not
connected with his professional conduct, before trial and conviction . . . . is to give the moral weight of the court's judgment
248. Cf. In re Chartoff, 16 App. Div. 2d 277, 227 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1962).
249. See In re Renehan, 19 N.M. 640, 145 Pac. 111, 121-22 (1914). Although instances of non-professional fraud by attorneys must be far outnumbered by instances
of non-professional breach of contract, there are a considerable number of reported
disciplinary cases involving fraudulent conduct. See cases cited note 216 supra.
250. Anonymous, 5 B. & Ad. 1088, 110 Eng. Rep. 1095 (K. B. 1834), quoted by the
majority in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 276 (1883), in an opinion that nonetheless
left the door open for hasty disciplinary proceedings in an indefinite number of cases.
Apparently no indictment did follow the proceedings in Wall. See Drinker, Legal Ethics 44 n.17 (1953).
It is often asserted that an attorney may be compelled to testify in a disciplinary
proceeding. See, e.g., Fellner v. Bar Ass'n of Baltimore, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729
(1957) ; In re Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527, 26 A.2d 335 (1942) ; cif. ABA Model Rule 1.05.
However, he may probably assert his privilege against self-incrimination, and his
refusal to answer on any ground probably cannot be given artificial probative weight.
See note 179 and text p. 344 supra.
251. 107 U.S. 265 (1883).
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against him upon the trial on an indictment for that offence. ' 252
Practically, the absence of premature proceedings is probably explained by the relative ease with which the fact of misconduct may
be established following a criminal conviction. To be distinguished
from premature disciplinary proceedings are those cases in which
no criminal charge has been brought or is reasonably foreseeable.
In these cases the courts have taken the position that the profession is not compelled to "harbor all persons of whatever character
who have gained admission to it and are fortunate enough to keep
out of jail or the penitentiary. '25 3 If the only explanation for failure
to prosecute a criminal offense was a considered decision by the appropriate prosecuting authority either that there was insufficient
evidence of misconduct or that even in the absence of punishment
the offender presented no real danger of future criminality, the fact
that an attorney's alleged non-professional misconduct resulted in
no criminal action would constitute good cause for refusal to hear a
disciplinary complaint. However, in typical cases, the failure to
prosecute can rather easily be explained apart from any such official
judgment concerning the evidence or the necessity of preventive
treatment. Misconduct involving fraud or the passing of bad checks
frequently would not be brought to the attention of the prosecuting
authorities because restitution had been made,25 4 or because the injured party had instead chosen to seek restitution or revenge by
filing a complaint with the bar committee.2 55 The relative privacy of
the committee hearings256 may appear particularly attractive to those
aggrieved parties who do not care to expose their past gullibility
in a public trial. 2 57 Thus, the courts appear to be justified in going
forward with disciplinary proceedings in the absence of prior criminal prosecution.2 58
252. Id. at 318.
253. In re Wilson, 79 Kan. 450, 100 Pac. 75, 77 (1949). For instances of imposition
of discipline without a prior criminal prosecution, see cases cited note 216 supra.
254. Cf. In re Wells, 293 Ky. 201, 168 S.W.2d 730 (1943) (prosecution discontinued
on payment of bad check).
255. See, e.g.,
In re Stone, 334 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. 1960) ; In re Hunt, 14 App. Div.
2d 397, 221 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1961).
256. Model Rule 1.07.
257. See, e.g., Mauer v. State Bar of California, 219 Cal. 271, 26 P.2d 14 (1933)
In re Raileanu, 225 App. Div. 90, 232 N.Y. Supp. 175 (1928) ; In re Isaacs, 17 App.
Div. 181, 158 N.Y. Supp. 403 (1916).
258. See Model Rule 2.04: "If the act constitutes a felony or misdemeanor, conviction thereof in a criminal proceeding is not a condition precedent to discipline." Factors that may have led to an official decision not to undertake criminal prosecution
may be considered in the disciplinary proceedings on the issue of unfitness.
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Acquittal of the Criminal Charge. Probably as difficult a problem
as any in the area of discipline for non-professional misconduct is
the effect to be given a prior acquittal of a criminal charge that included the acts claimed as grounds for discipline. Despite the admonition of Mr. Justice Field in Ex parte Wall that "if the court,
after acquittal, can still proceed for the alleged offense, as a majority
of my brethren declare it may, and call upon him to show that he is
not guilty or be disbarred, there is a defect in our Constitution and
laws which has, up to this day, remained undiscovered, ' 25 most
courts in recent years have said that an acquittal does not preclude
subsequent disciplinary action. 260 Various reasons have been given
for denying conclusive effect to an acquittal. One reason is that the
jury in the criminal case had to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
but only clear and convincing proof is required to support a finding
of misconduct in disciplinary proceedings. 2 1 However, once attention is clearly focused on the ultimate issue of unfitness, this argument must be regarded in some cases as unsound even in theory, i.e.,
where the acts of misconduct have not been admitted and there
are also doubts regarding the implications of the alleged misconduct for the attorney's fitness.26 2 As a practical matter, the argument is even more difficult to accept. Assuming that the jury's deliberations were confined to the facts of the alleged offense, a unanimous verdict of acquittal suggests something more than a sliver of
doubt.2 6 3 Whatever merit remains in the degree of persuasion argu259. 107 U.S. 265, 307 (1883) (dissenting opinion).
260. See In re Browning, 23 Ill.
2d 483, 179 N.E.2d 14 (1962), and cases cited
therein.
261. In re Browning, rupra note 260; In re Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527, 26 A.2d 335
(1942). See also note 141 supra.
The lesser burden of persuasion argument is, of course, inapposite to cases in
which the criminal charge was dismissed at the stage of preliminary examination for
lack of "probable cause." See People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Jackson, 322 Ill.
618,
153 N.E. 621 (1926).
It was also suggested in the Brow.ning and Chernoff cases, supra, that an acquittal
should not be deemed conclusive because the privilege against self-incrimination is
inapplicable to disciplinary proceedings. Reference has previously been made to the
questionable nature of this proposition. See notes 170 & 250 supra.
262. If "clear and convincing proof of unfitness" may be assigned a probability
value of .75, a probability value approaching "beyond a reasonable doubt" (e.g., .95)
is necessary with respect to the facts of misconduct even when the adverse implications for fitness of the alleged misconduct are relatively high (e.g., .79).
263. One would suppose that a sliver of doubt probably would not have been appreciated by every juror and would have provided those who did perceive the doubt
with little means to persuade the others. More likely than acquittal in a sliver of doubt
case would be a hung jury, see, e.g., In re Wilson, 76 Ariz. 49, 258 P.2d 433 (1953), or
a conviction of a lesser included offense, if this device is available.
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ment seems overbalanced by the attorney's justifiable expectations
resulting from an acquittal when the only issue at the criminal trial
was the existence of the facts relied upon in the disciplinary proceedings. A second argument for ignoring the jury's verdict of acquittal emphasizes the superior fact-finding abilities of the "trained
minds of judges. ' 264 It may be true that on the question of predicting future professional misconduct members of the legal profession
possess special competence, but well-established public policy requires deference to a jury's fact-finding capabilities. A third argument focuses on the possibility that acquittal by the jury resulted
from a reason other than a finding that the attorney did not do those
acts relied upon in the subsequent bar proceeding. Such a reason
would be the presence in the criminal case of a factual issue that 26is5
not crucial to a finding of misconduct by the bar committee.
Other reasons are suggested in the majority's opinion in Ex parte
Wall: "a prevailing popular excitement; powerful influences brought
to bear on the public mind, or on the mind of the jury. "266 In these
circumstances, the interests of the public and those of the individual
attorney seem closely enough balanced that the only acceptable
solution involves attempting to gauge from the criminal record
whether there was a substantial likelihood of the jury's failure 2to
67
come to grips with the facts essential to a finding of misconduct.
2. Disciplinary Proceedings Following a Criminal Conviction.
The Conclusive Effect of the Criminal Conviction. Model Rule
2.06 provides:
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude shall be conclusive
proof of the guilt of the respondent, and a plea or verdict of guilty
264-. In re Chernoff, 344 Pa. 527, 26 A.2d 335, 338 (1942).
265. For example, the value of the stolen goods in a prosecution for the crime of
grand larceny.
266. 107 U.S. 265, 287 (1883). See also In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W.2d
672, 678 (1933).
267. Such a flexible approach has apparently been adopted by the Illinois Supreme
Court. See In re Browning, 23 111. 2d 483, 179 N.E.2d 14 (1962), 50 Ill. Bar. J. 797.
The reversal on appeal of a criminal conviction for reasons other than insufficiency
of the evidence should afford no basis for barring a subsequent disciplinary proceeding. See Florida Bar v. King, 174 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1965).
With regard to prior acquittals, even in the area of professional misconduct, a
technical double jeopardy claim would presumably founder at the outset if a rule asserting that no disciplinary proceeding is for the purpose of "punishment" is taken
seriously. See Preamble, N.M. Rules (ABA Statement of Principles of Professional
Discipline) and text at note 47 supra; Best v. State Bar of California, 57 Cal. 2d 633,
371 P.2d 325 (1962). But see text p. 331 and notes 31 & 68 supra.
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or a plea of nolo contendere, where followed by a judgment of conviction, shall be deemed to be a conviction within the meaning of
26 s
this rule.

Of course, the conclusive effect of a conviction should be limited 269
to
those elements that were essential to a determination of guilt.
With this qualification, and in view of the "strict rules for the protection of the defendant ' 270 governing criminal cases, it would seem
reasonable to enforce a rule of preclusion following any contested
criminal conviction. When applied to contested cases, the model
rule's restriction to crimes involving moral turpitude appears unjustified; the nature of the offense bears no evident relation to the
reliability of the trier-of-fact's determination of guilt. The moral
turpitude requirement can perhaps be explained by the draftsman's
effort to deal in a single section with the preclusive effect of convictions following a contest and convictions following pleas of guilty
and nolo contendere.27 ' In attaching conclusive effect to convictions
following pleas of guilty or nolo contendere, it may have been
thought that an attorney charged with a crime not involving moral
turpitude would often choose not to contest the prosecution-for
reasons other than guilt. Such rules of non-preclusion may have merit
in situations in which serious consequences are sought to be attached
to conviction of a minor offense typically punished by a small fine,
for example, a minor traffic violation. But the usual grist of the
disciplinary mill is of a far different variety. Crimes not involving
moral turpitude that are properly used as grounds for discipline
seem invariably punishable by substantial fines or prison terms; conviction of such a crime should be deemed conclusive in disciplinary
proceedings, whether or not the criminal charge was contested by
the attorney.
268. 81 A.B.A. Rep. 487-88 (1956). New Mexico rule 3-2.06 does not differ in any
material respect. The model rule provision resolves a conflict of authority concerning
the probative value on the issue of misconduct to be accorded a conviction in juris"dictions that, like the model rules, did not make the fact of conviction itself ground for
discipline. Compare In re Needham, 364 Ill.
65, 4 N.E.2d 19 (1936) ; In re Welansky,
319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.24 202 (1946) ; State ex rel. Sorensen v. Scoville, 123 Neb. 457,
243 N.W. 269 (1932) (the foregoing cases considered conviction conclusive evidence),
qwith State v. O'Leary, 207 Wis. 297, 24-1 N.W. 621 (1932) (prima facie evidence).
269. In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954).

270. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Scoville, 123 Neb. 457, 243 N.W. 269 (1932).
271. Jurisdictions in which the fact of conviction is not itself made a ground for
discipline (as it is not under the model rules) have generally refused to give conclusive effect to conviction following a plea of nolo contendere. See, e.g., Fellner v.
Bar Ass'n of Baltimore, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957). See also Annot., 152 A.L.R.
253, 287-90 (1944).
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The Consequences of Conviction and the Determination of Unfitness. Without extensive research, an elaborate psychological
analysis of convicted attorneys is impossible, but attorneys convicted of crimes resulting from relevant non-professional misconduct
might be thought to fall primarily into two categories of criminal
offenders. Within the classifications suggested by Guttmacher and
Weihofen1 71 attorneys guilty of non-fraudulent tax offenses and the
drawing of checks on insufficient funds (for the purpose of avoiding
pressing obligations) should probably be classed as "occasional or
accidental criminals" possessing "a weak ego structure which can be
temporarily overwhelmed. ' 27 8 In contrast, attorneys who carefully
contrive fraudulent schemes may probably be classed as "normal
criminals" whose criminality stems from environmental factors involving weak ethical standards. 27 4 Punishment imposed on the attorney who is an "occasional or accidental" offender may often consist
of only a fine, or a suspended sentence and probation, or a deferral
of sentencing. 7 5 Because of the "deterrent effect of the experience
from apprehension to conviction" and the "stability of the surroundings and personality make-up of the defendant, '27 these offenders
may be deemed to present an insufficient risk of future harm to
warrant the preventive treatment of imprisonment. Such a judicial
finding should be accorded considerable weight in a subsequent
272. Psychiatry and the Law, ch. 16 (1952).
273. Id. at 385.
274. Id. at 385-86. Recent studies have revealed a great diversity of personal backgrounds and of professional environments within the legal profession. See generally
Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own (1962) ; Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer (1964);
Ladinsky, The Impact of Social Backgrounds of Lawyers on Law Practice and the
Law, 16 J. Legal Ed. 127 (1963).
275. See, e.g., In re Morris, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (1964). For an account of
the criminal prosecution in Morris, which resulted in a deferred sentence, see note S
supra and accompanying text. See also In re Van Arsdale, 44 N.J. 318, 208 A.2d 801
(1965) ; State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis. 2d 38, 119 N.W.2d 412 (1963).
276. National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Probation Services in Pennsylvania 156 (1957), quoted in Rubin, Weihofen, Edwards & Rosenzweig, The Law of
Criminal Correction 170 n.81 (1963).
In at least one case, the publicity, humiliation, and loss of position resulting from
a prior criminal prosecution were considered in mitigation of the discipline to be
imposed. Florida Bar v. King, 174 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1965). Concerning circumstances
under which it is appropriate to impose a fine as the sole criminal penalty, the Model
Penal Code provides that
the Court shall not sentence a defendant only to pay a fine, when any other
disposition is authorized by law, unless having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant,
it is of the opinion that the fine alone suffices for protection of the public.
Model Penal Code §7.02(1) (Proposed Off. Draft 1962).
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disciplinary proceeding to determine unfitness.277 An attorney convicted of more calculated criminality will probably be sentenced to
imprisonment. Preventive treatment of this kind may well be necessary in the case of an offender whose present environment encourages anti-social conduct, and thus is not likely to contribute to his
rehabilitation. Assuming that such an attorney has been automatically suspended from practice during his period of imprisonment,2 78
and must petition for termination of the suspension, how much
weight should be given his confinement in passing upon his fitness to
resume practice? One might suspect that the answer to this question
is "rather little." First, good conduct in prison, where opportunities
for wrongdoing are at most of a very elemental kind, offers little
assurance that when occasions for more sophisticated malefactions
are again present, they will not be seized upon. Second, it may be
doubted whether an attorney whose legal education and professional
experience have failed to develop acceptable standards of personal
conduct will have been reoriented by a term in prison 79 However,
one must concede that in some instances of "one-time" misconduct,
the unpleasant prison experience may have served to reinforce preexisting ethical standards that had been purposefully abandoned.
C.

Appropriate Treatment for the Unfit Lawyer

When the attorney's non-professional misconduct has led the
court to determine that he is unfit to practice, it must then seek a
disposition fair to the attorney and adequate to protect the2 public,
0
the profession, and the courts from professional misconduct. ,
Given a prior determination of unfitness, a disposition solely by
reprimand or censure, public or private, seems questionable. It
may be supposed that a reprimand will have the salutary effect of
transforming the unfit to fitness overnight, but such a transformation
is unlikely. When the disciplinary proceeding follows conviction of
a criminal offense, the shame and embarrassment attending a repri277. While the attorney's fitness must remain the primary concern of disciplinary
proceedings, some consideration might be given to the fact that a mode of criminal
treatment relying on continuity of environment will probably not be furthered by suspending the attorney from practice.
278. See note 96 supra and note 193 supra and accompanying text.
279. However, weight should be given an attorney's response to psychiatric treatment received during imprisonment.
280. Model rule 3.01 contemplates that the bar committee exercising the adjudicatory
function should not only determine whether or not the attorney's misconduct warrants
discipline, hut that it should make recommendations to the court regarding the form
and severity of discipline to be imposed.

368

NATURAL

[VOL. 5

RESOURCES JOURNAL

mand would be negligible compared to the condemnation and disgrace that resulted from the public trial and conviction, events that
by hypothesis have failed to assure the attorney's fitness. Even
when no criminal prosecution resulted from the non-professional
misconduct, it seems unlikely that a reprimand would have substantial impact on an attorney whose years of law study and professional
experience have failed to inculcate acceptable ethical standards.
Because a reprimand neither removes an attorney from practice nor,
in all probability, accomplishes his rehabilitation, it seems a particularly unreliable device for protecting the public; and in terms
of anticipated public reaction, a reprimand clearly implies
"the re' 28
tention in the profession of proven irresponsibles.

1

If the court determines that the attorney is presently fit to practice, the disciplinary charges should be dismissed. 2 When the attorney is found to be fit, a reprimand directed to the nature of his
non-professional misconduct can only be explained as a special punishment to which the individual is subjected because he is a member of
the legal profession. Yet, so long as bar committees fail to limit
their preliminary inquiries concerning non-professional misconduct
to the single question of unfitness, courts will have to dispose of a
number of records that contain no showing of unfitness. Judges are
themselves members of the bar and may find it awkward to reject
the disciplinary recommendations of their colleagues. Moreover,
judges will be aware of the public interest in well-publicized disciplinary cases. For these reasons, some courts may not care to dismiss an insufficient complaint without some criticism of the attorney's
behavior. The use of a reprimand under these circumstances, though
not desirable, is understandable. 88
Like the reprimand, permanent disbarment from practice seems
an ill-suited disposition when unfitness has been determined by nonprofessional misconduct. Whether or not such a "death penalty" with
respect to the lawyer's professional life may be justified as the
ultimate deterrent in cases of professional misconduct, it must be
regarded as unnecessarily harsh when discipline is to be imposed
281. Minority Report, Special Comm. on Disciplinary Procedures, 81 A.B.A. Rep.
477,481 (1956).
282. See, e.g., Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927) ; Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v. Brown, 302 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. 1957).
283. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. King, 174 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1965). The reprimand
imposed in State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis. 2d 38, 119 N.W.2d 412 (1963), was frankly
explained as punishment. See note 31 supra. A reprimand is a proper if not very
promising sanction for professional misconduct.
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solely for the purpose of prevention. No attorney should be considered beyond redemption, and even in extreme cases, the fact that
an attorney after a long suspension is willing to begin practice anew
offers some assurance of future responsibility.
The form of discipline best calculated to protect the public without undue harshness to the attorney is suspension from practice for
an indefinite period. If an attorney is automatically supended during
a period of imprisonment, and his application for termination of
the suspension (treated as an original disciplinary proceeding) is
denied, further indefinite suspension would take the form of a continuation of the existing suspension.
Under the Model Rules, an indefinite suspension must be coupled
with the setting of "a minimum period which must elapse before
the court will entertain a motion by the respondent for termination
of suspension. ' 2 4 The requirement that a suspended attorney take
affirmative steps to regain professional status marks an improvement over the practice of suspending for a fixed period of time with
automatic reinstatement thereafter.21 5 The model rule affords an opportunity for an evaluation of the attorney's fitness to resume practice. If this opportunity is to be effectively utilized, notice of the
petition for termination of suspension should be given to an appropriate bar investigating committee, and by this committee to
other interested persons. 8 6 State or local bar publications should
provide a suitable medium for the solicitation of comments on the
petition, favorable or unfavorable.28 7
The model rule, however, cautions that the setting of a minimum
period of suspension "should not be construed to imply that the
respondent will be entitled to the termination of his suspension at
the end of such minimum period, ' 28 and a later rule places a burden of showing fitness "by clear and convincing evidence" on the
284. Model Rule 3.01.
285. In New York, the appellate division, first department, appears to follow
consistently the practice of suspending for a "fixed period." See, e.g., In re Rotwein, 20
App. Div. 2d 428, 247 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1964) ; In re Nearing, 16 App. Div. 2d 516, 229
N.Y.S.2d 567 (1962).
286. Under model rule 3.03, notice is given to the bar commissioners, but there is
no specific provision for notice to other persons.
287. It would not seem too onerous a requirement for the suspended attorney to
submit with his petition for termination of suspension a short summary of information, similar to that required for admission to the bar, covering only the period from
the date of his suspension. Availability of this information would facilitate whatever
inquiries regarding the attorney's character and conduct the investigating committee
considered necessary.
288. Model Rule 3.01.
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suspended attorney. 8 9 Along the same line, it has been suggested
that the provision for individual minimum periods of suspension
should be abandoned entirely, in favor of the establishment of a
uniform minimum period (presumably quite short) for all cases. 290
The "show-me" approach has certain theoretical merits; in its focus
on actual evidence of rehabilitation it seems to be at the same time
fairer to the attorney and more reliable in terms of the public welfare. Nevertheless, there are good reasons why variable minimum
periods should be utilized and why, in the absence of a showing of
misconduct during the period of suspension, an attorney should be
reinstated as a matter of course. Because an order of suspension
removes the attorney from his usual professional milieu, what would
be his best evidence of rehabilitation is denied him. Dislocated from
his former social and economic surroundings, the attorney, in an
ordinary case, will probably be able to produce only a rather unremarkable record of steady work and decorous conduct. To demand
clear and convincing proof is to demand the impossible. 2 91 Thus,
any realistic scheme of suspension necessarily must involve a guess
by the court regarding the length of the period of clean living that
will provide adequate assurance of rehabilitation.2 92 This guess may
as well be made, and in fairness to the attorney who must plan his
affairs,29 should be made, at the time he is determined to be unfit.
289. Model Rule 3.03.
290. Minority Report, supra note 281, at 480.
291. Similarly unrealistic is the earlier requirement that the suspended attorney's
application for termination of suspension set forth "facts showing he has rehabilitated
himself." Model Rule 3.02(b).
292. But see Minority Report, supra note 281, at 480:
[A]ny variation in the minimum period can be justified only on the theory that
it must fit the enormity of the offense, and it injects back into the system of
discipline to be established exactly what the Statement of Principles says shall
not be injected-the theory of punishment. . . . [Emphasis by the author of the
Minority Report.]
Variations in periods of suspension may also be explained by further reference
to factors previously considered in deciding that some discipline' should be imposed: the
nature of the unfitness disclosed by the particular type of misconduct, see text pp. 354-57
supra; the likelihood of "carry-over" to professional activity, see text pp. 357-60 supra;
and the estimated impact of sanctions that have already been imposed, see text, pp.
366-67 supra. The greater the danger to the administration of justice, the greater the assurance of rehabilitation that should be required.
293. The necessity of such planning distinguishes the attorney who is indefinitely
suspended from the prisoner who is serving an indeterminate sentence.
In Wood v. State ex rel. Boykin, 45 Ga. App. 783, 165 S.E. 908 (1932), the attorney's acts of misconduct were apparently caused by alcoholism. Although it was
not denied that he had been sober for a period of four months before disciplinary
proceedings were initiated (and for almost two years before the court's decision on
appeal), the attorney was disbarred-because his sobriety had extended for only "a
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If a reasonable time for comment on the attorney's petition has been
given (e.g., thirty days) and the bar investigating committee has
not received information sufficient to warrant filing a formal objection to the petition, the suspension should be terminated. If an objection is filed, a hearing should be held before the bar committee
exercising adjudicatory functions, with the burden on the investigating committee to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the attorney's conduct during the period of suspension warrants a
finding that he remains unfit to practice. 9 4 Upon the confirmation of
such a finding by the court, the suspension should be continued, with
leave to reapply at a definite time in the future.
CONCLUSION
Equal protection and individualized treatment for lawyers are
more than mere technicalities imposed on the bar by constitutional
command; they are assumptions basic to any fair and intelligent
scheme of discipline for non-professional misconduct. Yet, they have
not received adequate attention by the bar and bench. While one
who has surveyed past decisions could not honestly report pervasive
injustice, the number of mistakes has been too great to permit indifference. Rule-makers (including the draftsmen of the Model
Rules) have not helped the situation by lumping disciplinary proceedings for non-professional misconduct with those for professional delinquencies. Indeed, a useful first step toward careful
analysis might be abandonment of the term "disciplinary proceeding" in the non-professional area in favor of the term "proceeding
to determine fitness to practice." If such limited jurisdiction over
non-professional misconduct seems to the reader inadequate to the
job of cleansing the bar of "undesirables," he may be consoled by
the fact that "it is a poor sport that is not worth the candle."
However painful the realization, the day is fast arriving when an
few months"-with leave to apply for reinstatement at "the proper time." Compare
In re Evans, 94 S.C. 414, 78 S.E. 227 (1913), another case involving misconduct caused
by alcoholism, in which the attorney was suspended with leave to apply for reinstatement after two years of sobriety.
294. Concerning the need for separating investigatory and prosecuting functions
from the adjudicatory function within the bar's disciplinary machinery, see Note, 13
Notre Dame Law. 346, 354 (1962).
The New Mexico rules clearly provide for such sepa'ation of functions in both
original disciplinary proceedings and in proceedings for the termination of suspension.
See N.M. Rules 3-1.02, -1.03, -1.05, -3.03. The comparable provisions in the Model
Rules are less specific, but separation of functions is apparently contemplated, at
least for original disciplinary proceedings.
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attorney in the United States can no longer expect to derive complacent self-satisfaction from being closely identified with the more
admired personal qualities of his colleagues at the bar. Absent a
sharp reduction in the number of tasks society expects attorneys to
perform,"9 5 further expansion in the size of the legal profession
may be anticipated, and the trend toward specialization-by choice
and by necessity 2 9-will no doubt continue. These factors, and increasing diversity in the social, economic, and cultural backgrounds
of attorneys, will inevitably obliterate the nostalgic and fading
image of the legal profession as an exclusive and genteel social club.
Then, more than ever before, the status of the legal profession will
depend on its faithful service to the needs of society.

295. Such a reduction might be accomplished by the formal creation of "an adjunct
or subprofessional class" to perform routine legal functions at a more reasonable
cost than they can be performed by attorneys. See Schwartz, Foreword: Group Legal
Services in Perspective, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 279, 303-05 (1965).
296. With respect to the latter form of specialization, see generally Carlin, Lawyers

on Their Own (1962).

